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CHAPTER 1
Market Failures and Misallocation: Separating
the Costs of Factor and Financial Market
Failures
1.1 Introduction
Two decades of research in growth have concluded that differences in aggregate resources
cannot explain differences in aggregate output, and economists have now asked whether
the allocation of aggregate resources can. Hsieh and Klenow (2009), for example, argue
India could raise manufacturing output by 40 to 60 percent if it allocated its labor and
capital among firms as efficiently as the U.S., and by 100 percent if the allocations were
perfect. Yet their study cannot tell where the observed misallocation comes from. Theorists
cannot build accurate models and policymakers cannot design useful interventions unless
they know what frictions cause misallocation.
I develop a method to measure and separate the misallocation caused by factor and fi-
nancial market failures, two frictions that set poor countries apart from rich. With perfect
markets each firm’s optimal allocation depends only on two sets of parameters: its produc-
tivity and the common production function. I use a dynamic panel approach to estimate
the parameters and calculate the optimal allocation. I define the increase in output from
optimal reallocation to be the total misallocation from factor and financial market failures.
To separate the cost of each market’s failure I exploit how factor markets govern the firm’s
mix of inputs. When factor markets are perfect, a firm can optimally divide its spending
between inputs. By perfecting each firm’s mix of inputs while holding its scale constant,
I place a lower bound on the aggregate gains from perfecting factor markets, and by then
perfecting scale I place an upper bound on the gains from subsequently perfecting financial
markets. Finally, I decompose aggregate output into three components: an aggregate pro-
duction function, average firm-level productivity, and the efficiency of factor allocations. I
1
calculate the counterfactual path of aggregate output if growth in any component were shut
down. The counterfactuals show how output would have grown if factor allocations had
not improved.
My method only works in a setting where factor and financial market failures cause all
misallocation, and I study Thailand’s rice sector because it fits the assumption well. Since
rice production is relatively uniform I can estimate a common production function and
correctly calculate each farmer’s marginal product, minimizing the spurious misallocation
caused by measurement error. Other sources of misallocation like monopoly, taxes, and
adjustment costs are rare in rice farming. It is also plausible that a farmer chooses land,
labor, and capital with equal information about her productivity, letting me calculate her
ideal mix of inputs, which I use to separate factor and financial market failures.
I find surprisingly little misallocation. The overall cost is 15 percent of output in 1996
and falls to 4 percent by 2008. By then most misallocation comes from factor markets
rather than financial markets. Decreases in misallocation contributed little to growth in
aggregate rice output relative to growth from factor accumulation and rising average pro-
ductivity. As Thailand industrializes, labor and capital have left the rice sector. I find that
their departure would have caused rice output to fall if farms had not also grown more
productive. Finally, I assess the impact on misallocation of the quasi-experimental Million
Baht credit program first studied by Kaboski and Townsend (2011). Additional credit has
a statistically significant but small effect. A one percent increase in credit reduced misal-
location by .1 percentage points, and as expected the program worked almost entirely by
reducing misallocation from financial market failures.
Economists started measuring misallocation in response to evidence that financial mar-
kets in poor countries do not allocate capital efficiently.1 Communal divisions inefficiently
concentrate capital among incumbent garment manufacturers in India (Banerjee and Mun-
shi, 2004), lending arrangements fail to perfectly insure households in Nigeria (Udry,
1994), and entrepreneurs could reap large returns with small capital investments in Sri
Lanka (De Mel et al., 2008). Until recently, however, few studies tried to quantify the
aggregate costs of misallocation, prompting Banerjee and Duflo (2005) to emphasize the
question and its implications. Jeong and Townsend (2007) explored the idea with a struc-
tural model where credit constraints prevent households from buying capital and switching
sectors. Their model reproduces much of the change in Thailand’s Solow residual even
with zero technological progress. With few exceptions (e.g. Benjamin, 1992), the literature
1In addition to those I cite in the main text, other recent papers on misallocation include Restuccia and
Rogerson (2008); Banerjee and Moll (2010); Peters (2011); Bollard et al. (2012); Alfaro et al. (2008); Bar-
telsman et al. (2009); Jones (2011); Osotimehin (2011); Alfaro and Chari (2012); Moll (2010).
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has focused primarily on financial markets—markets for credit and insurance—and paid
little attention to factor markets, where households hire labor and rent land and capital. But
if factor markets cause most misallocation, governments ought to worry less about getting
credit to the poor and focus on, for example, eliminating regulations that distort the market
for land.
Hsieh and Klenow’s study (2009), on the other hand, calculates the cost of all misal-
location regardless of the source. They build a model of monopolistic competition where
firms pay “taxes” to sell output and rent capital. The authors derive the aggregate gains to
reallocating factors within manufacturing industries and plug in production functions cali-
brated with U.S. data. They argue India and China’s distorted factor and financial markets
are why they have more misallocation than the U.S., but their approach cannot actually link
misallocation to its cause. I too compare the actual allocation to more optimal allocations,
but my method and context let me attribute misallocation to factor and financial market fail-
ures. Midrigan and Xu (2013) approach a question similar to mine with a different method
and find a similar answer. Instead of measuring misallocation caused by financial market
failures, they calibrate a model of credit-constrained firms and find it cannot predict much
of the variation in the marginal product of capital.
To my knowledge this paper is the first to split misallocation into the contributions of
factor versus financial markets, and I find earlier work may have been wrong to ignore
factor markets. I also measure misallocation under more plausible assumptions than earlier
work. For example, since rice production is relatively uniform I can estimate the production
function instead of assuming U.S. parameters describe Thailand’s production. In addition,
I measure misallocation at each point in time using a household survey, making sample
attrition less likely to bias the result. Finally, I link misallocation to its sources under
weaker assumptions than earlier work, which uses structural models to simulate how much
misallocation would occur if each constraint firms face were eased or tightened. Only if
the constraints are modeled correctly can they accurately link misallocation to its causes.
In contrast, I do not have to assume I perfectly model constraints to measure misallocation
from factor versus financial markets.
1.2 Misallocation among Thai Rice Farmers
My crucial assumption is that all misallocation in the Thai rice sector comes from factor
or financial market failures. Comparing the original allocation of land, labor, and capital
to the allocation that equalizes marginal products does not work if marginal products differ
for reasons other than factor and financial market failures. The econometrician might mis-
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calculate marginal products and find misallocation where there is none. He may assume
the wrong technology or incorrectly assume firms use the same technology. Unanticipated
productivity shocks might change firms’ marginal products after they choose their factors,
making the allocation look inefficient even when markets are perfect. Real forces other
than weak factor and financial markets might also drive marginal products apart. Firms
may pay different taxes, have adjustment costs, or be monopolists.
Such issues cause fewer problems in rice farming than in manufacturing. Rice produc-
tion is relatively uniform and transparent. Though not all farmers in Thailand grow the
same type of rice, they grow each variety following a similar technique.2 And unlike in
many developing countries nearly all farmers use modern pesticides and fertilizers. Figure
1.1 shows that nearly 100 percent of my sample uses modern farming technology (fertil-
izers or pesticides) throughout the entire sample period. 3 I can estimate a common pro-
duction function for all farmers without departing too far from the truth. Since identifying
the sources of anticipated versus unanticipated productivity is easier in rice production—
a farmer knows his own talent but does not know whether rats will eat his crop after the
harvest—I can model productivity as described in Section 1.5.2.
Monopoly, taxation, and adjustment costs are not big problems in the rice sector, either.
Rice is a commodity and Thai farmers are all price-takers who sell their output to mills and
merchants at market prices. In Shenoy (2014b) I show that farmers’ selling prices move
with the international rice price. Though the government often supports prices, price sub-
sidies will affect all farmers equally and leave allocations unchanged. Thailand’s farmers
grow rice more commercially than their Indian or Chinese counterparts, but they enjoy a
similar lack of taxes. Of the roughly 1500 survey households who reported any agricul-
tural activity in 1996, only eight reported paying land taxes. Less than two percent of rice
farmers in the monthly survey report paying any income tax. My assumption that farmers
in a village can exchange factors without adjustment costs is also plausible. Tractors have
wheels and bullocks have legs, most on-farm machinery is not too large to move, and one
farmer can store his crops in another’s granary. There is no cost to hiring or firing a casual
farm worker. Exchanging land is not difficult, as over three quarters of the rice paddies
2The farmer seeds a nursery plot and transplants the seedlings to a flooded paddy where they grow to
adulthood. Farmers fertilize and apply pesticides until the rice matures and they harvest, thresh, dry, and
sell the grains. According to the International Rice Research Institute, most of Thailand’s farmers use this
lowland rain-fed method to grow their rice.
3 Thailand was an early ally of the U.S. during the Cold War and received American aid to modernize its
rice sector in the 1960s. Despite fears to the contrary, both small and large farmers adopted the new seeds
and fertilizers. The adoption of fertilizer was so rapid that, according to Baker and Phongpaichit (2009), a
Japanese anthropologist visiting in 1970 found ”Villagers who had described the local rituals to him only a
decade ago now exclaimed ‘the rice spirit is no match for chemical fertilizer’.”
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Figure 1.1







1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
year
%renting capital %hiring labor
%modern farming tech %constrained
%farming rice %renting land
Note: Descriptive statistics of the sample. I describe the sample in
more depth in Section 1.4.
cultivated in 1996-1997 are no more than two kilometers from the village.
Not only are other sources of misallocation absent, but also the assumptions I make
to calculate the optimal allocation are more plausible among Thai rice farmers. Two of
those assumptions are that productivity is Hicks-Neutral and technology is Cobb-Douglas.
Productivity need not be Hicks-Neutral—that is, affect all factors of production equally—
in manufacturing or services. If demand for sneakers rises, Nike’s marketing team does
more to increase its sales than does the quality of its machinery. Different factors at Nike
essentially make different products. Machines and unskilled labor make shoes while skilled
workers make a marketing campaign. In rice farming, however, all factors work to make
a single product. The farmer’s year-to-year productivity shocks—rainfall and pests—will
damage the end crop, not the individual contribution of the workers or the tractors. If the
farmer falls ill the lost productivity comes from a reduction in her managerial ability, as she
can hire others to supply labor. Major advances like the invention of the tractor are unlikely
in my thirteen-year sample. The Cobb-Douglas assumption—that the optimal share of
expenditure on labor versus capital does not change with scale—is also more plausible
because the farmer will farm each additional plot of land much like the previous. I also
verify the assumption approximates reality in Appendix A.5.4
To split factor market and financial market misallocation I approximate what would
happen if each village perfected its factor markets but left its financial markets untouched.
4The general model and procedure I present in Appendix A.3 does not require any assumptions beyond
concavity, decreasing returns, and twice-differentiability. But estimating a more complicated production
function requires stronger assumptions about productivity and factor input choices.
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Assuming (as I have argued) adjustment costs are small, with perfect factor markets a
farmer will always choose the optimal mix of factors regardless of overall expenditure. To
calculate the optimal mix I assume the farmer chooses all factors with the same informa-
tion about within-village productivity shocks. The assumption, which implies all farmers
choose the same mix, would be too strong if it applied to all shocks. A farmer does not
know how much rain will fall when he chooses how much land to sow, but he does when he
hires workers at harvest. Rainfall and other village-level shocks, however, affect all farm-
ers in the village and have no allocative effects. Most within-village shocks, such as when
pests eat freshly harvested rice, happen after all factors are chosen or show no effects until
harvest. Shocks like illness, however, can strike after renting land but before hiring labor
or renting tractors. If such shocks are common I may incorrectly measure the misallocation
from factor market imperfections. But illness is not common (see Section 1.4), and I show
in Section 1.7 that my measures of factor and financial market misallocation respond as
expected to a credit intervention. 5
A common problem in panels of manufacturing firms is that unproductive firms leave
the industry and equally unproductive ones enter, but the entrants do not appear in the panel.
Over time the sample becomes more productive than the population. Since households still
farm most of Thailand’s rice, however, I can measure production using a household survey,
which follows both farmers and non-farmers. New entrants to farming—households who
did not farm at baseline but start farming later on—will enter my sample of farmers at the
same rate as the population because the survey was representative at baseline. Migration,
which entirely removes households from the survey, is relatively rare. Since the Project
sampled new households to replace the ones who left, the sample does not become too
unrepresentative. I do not need to assume a stable sample of farmers because exit does not
bias my estimate of misallocation. When a farmer exits, he takes his factors out of rice
production. The farmers and factors that remain represent the sector’s current state, and
misallocation is still the output gained from redistributing the factors more efficiently.6
5What if farmers can get credit to purchase some factors but not others? The most obvious example is
store credit for seeds and fertilizer. With perfect factor markets a farmer can arbitrage borrowed seeds and
fertilizer to acquire land or capital, so my argument about perfect mix still holds. Regardless, few households
report borrowing anything on store credit at baseline.
6I must exclude from the sample farmers who farm only once because I cannot calculate a fixed effect for
them. If they are severely over- or under-allocated, villages will falsely appear efficient. A one-time farmer,
however, can only enter and exit if the rental or purchase markets work well. As villages with efficient
markets have little misallocation, if anything the bias works towards finding too much misallocation because
the efficient villages receive less weight in the sector-level calculation of efficiency.
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1.3 Measuring Misallocation
I now present a model of household rice production and derive from it my measures of mis-
allocation. In building the model I sacrifice generality in favor of clarity and consistency.
The model reflects rice production in Thailand as described in Section 1.2 and imposes the
functional forms I use to compute my measures in Section 1.6. I describe a more general
approach in Appendix A.3.
1.3.1 Environment
The farmer maximizes her discounted lifetime utility from consumption. She uses capital
K, land T , and labor L to produce farm revenue y. Let X denote the vector of productive
factors chosen. The factors may come from her stock of owned factors Xo or the factors
she rents from factor marketsX −Xo. She buys Iit factors, and owned factors depreciate
at rates recorded in the matrix δ. The vector of “owned” factors Xo includes family labor,
which I assume exogenous for notational simplicity (making labor decisions endogenous
changes nothing because I only care about labor allocations between farms). I implicitly
assume family labor and hired labor are perfect substitutes, though relaxing the assumption
does not change the result much.7 The farmer buys factors (except labor) at a vector of
prices p and rents them at pricesw. Her output also depends on Hicks-Neutral productivity,
part of which she anticipates when choosing factors (A) while the rest (φ) is random and
unanticipated.
Farmer i faces her own set of prices, a budget constraint, a liquidity constraint, and a
factor market constraint. At the beginning of each year she spends z on renting and buying
factors. Any spending beyond gross interest on her savings from last year Rb is borrowed
at gross rate Rz and repaid after the harvest. She faces a liquidity constraint z̄, which is
a function of the owned land she offers as collateral and differs across farmers (perhaps
because they differ in how many cosigners or rich relatives they have). She cannot rent in
more factors thanX or rent out more factors thanX . Since she lacks perfect insurance her
consumption may be correlated with the unanticipated shock φ, and the effect on her utility
depends on the parameters γi. The Lagrange multipliers λ, ω, and κ, κ capture the shadow
costs of the budget, liquidity, and factor market constraints.















zit = wit(Xit −Xoit) + pitIit (Expenditure)
Xoit = Iit + (1− δ)Xoi,t−1 (Owned Assets)
λ : cit + bi,t+1 = yit −Rzit(T oit)(zit −Rbitbit) (Budget Const.)
ω : zit −Rbitbit ≤ z̄it (Liquidity Const.)
κ, κ : X it ≤Xit −Xoit ≤X it (Factor Market Const.)
1.3.2 Perfect Choices and Distortions





it − (Rzit(T oit)E[λit]− ωit)wKit + κ− κ = 0
Optimal land and labor choices satisfy similar conditions. When markets are fully
perfect the unanticipated shock does not affect consumption (E[λitφit] = E[λit]E[φit]),




t ), the liquidity constraint does not bind
(ωit = 0), farmers pay the same rental prices (wKit = w
K
t ), and factor market constraints do



















The expression implies marginal products are equalized across all farmers in the village.
Now suppose factor markets are perfect, so wKit = w
K
t , κit = κit = 0, but financial

































The condition implies capital-land ratios are equalized across farmers throughout the
village, and by similar logic the land-labor ratios are as well.
1.3.3 Optimal Allocations
How would perfect markets allocate the aggregate factor stock? Suppress time subscripts
for notational simplicity and suppose i is a farmer in village I observed to use K̄i, T̄i, L̄i. 8
The observed factor stocks are KI =
∑
i∈I K̄i and so on, and they do not change because
I only reallocate the village’s existing resources. With aggregate stocks pinned down, I can














































Plug this back into the individual factor choice to derive the optimal allocations with
fully perfect markets:
8Since factor markets must clear at any point in time and the conditions for perfect choices (1.1 and 1.2)
















θK (T ∗i )
θT (L∗i )
θL .
Now suppose factor markets are perfected but financial markets left untouched. Equa-
tion 1.2 gives the optimal mix but not the overall scale of factors for each farmer, so I






T T̄i + w
LL̄i
whereK+i is the farmer’s new choice of capital while K̄ is still her original choice, now
treated like an endowment. Any assumption about scale would define the allocation, but
this one is appealing because it casts the farmers into an Edgeworth economy where their
original factor choices are like endowments. The farmer choosing a profit-maximizing mix
of factors behaves like a consumer choosing a utility-maximizing bundle of goods. The
resulting allocation is easy to compute and perfects each farmer’s mix of factors while
leaving her scale fixed. Each farmer’s allocation may differ from what she would choose
given perfect factor markets and no extra constraints on scale. But under an assumption I
explain in Section 1.3.4, gains from moving to the computed allocation are a lower bound
on true misallocation from imperfect factor markets.




θK + θT + θL
· w
KK̄i + w















































































1.3.4 Costs of Misallocation
For all three scenarios, aggregate output in village I is the sum of each farmer’s output:
actual output YI , output with fully perfect markets Y ∗I , and output with only perfect factor
markets Y +I . I use two measures of misallocation: the gains from perfecting one or more
markets, and the fraction of efficient output achieved. The gains from reallocation (or
simply “misallocation”) measure how much output a village loses from misallocations.
The fraction of efficient output achieved (or “efficiency”) compares the real world to the
world with perfect markets and appears naturally in the aggregate production function I
derive in Section 1.3.5. Define
GI =
Y ∗I − YI
YI
GFACTI =
Y +I − YI
YI
GFINI =












The gains from perfecting each market add up to the overall gains (GI = GFACTI +
GFINI ), and overall efficiency is the product of factor and financial market efficiency (EI =
EFACTI · EFINI ). The overall gains are a decreasing function of efficiency (GI = 1EI − 1).
The factor market misallocation I compute (GFACTI ) need not equal the true gains from
perfecting factor markets. I compute factor market misallocation by holding each farmer’s
scale of production fixed, but if factor markets actually became perfect a productive farmer
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would probably increase her scale. Since she can allocate each dollar to the factor she needs
most, every dollar spent on rice farming yields more revenue than it would with imperfect
factor markets. Proposition 1, which I prove in Appendix A.1, formalizes this argument:
Proposition 1 Let K̃+i be the level of capital farmer i would choose if factor markets were
perfected, financial markets left untouched, and the endowment constraint were not im-
posed. Assume E[Ai((K̃+i )σ − (K+i )σ)] > 0. Then in expectation GFACTI is a lower bound
on the true gains from perfecting factor markets and GFINI an upper bound on the true
gains from subsequently perfecting financial markets.
The assumption states that with perfect factor markets the most productive farmers will
increase their scale relative to the actual outcome. 9 The only reason the assumption might
fail is if factor market failures somehow compensate for financial market failures, such as
if the farmers who cannot get bank loans can rent land more cheaply than everyone else,
and they are also the most productive farmers. The scenario is implausible in a poor rural
village, where those shut out of financial markets are usually shut out of factor markets as
well.10
1.3.5 Decomposing Aggregate Output and Growth
Growth accounting traditionally measures changes in per capita output and not per firm
output, so I decompose the growth in the village’s rice output per household instead of per
farmer. Suppose I is the set of all households (rice-farming or otherwise) in village I , and
let Y = Y|I| be per household rice output. Let Zit = Aitφit denote overall productivity, ZIt
its mean and Z̃it deviations from the mean. I use overall productivity to be consistent with
traditional growth accounting (which computes an overall Solow residual) and because it
is difficult to split aggregate shocks into anticipated and unanticipated parts. 11
9Capital simply stands in for scale of production. I could have phrased the proposition in terms of land or
labor just as easily because the ratios of all factors are fixed by (1.2).
10The proof is an equivalency result, so if the assumption failed and E[Ai((K̃+i )σ − (K
+
i )
σ)] < 0, the




computed gains equal actual gains.
11For example, how much of a district-year dummy is anticipated? The distinction does not matter for
within-village reallocation but will affect how much growth is assigned to anticipated versus unanticipated
aggregate productivity. Rather than make an arbitrary and misleading distinction I combine the two and call
the result overall productivity.
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Then











= ZItEItF (KIt, TIt, LIt; {Ãit}{φ̃it})




it are only functions of the
aggregate stocks and relative productivity. So taking the relative productivity distribution
{Ãit}, {φ̃it} as a parameter, F is a function of only aggregate capital, land, and labor—the
aggregate production function.
I can derive a similar decomposition for sample-wide output Yt, but since households
were sampled into the survey in multiple stages the decomposition must weight villages by
their size. Let κIt be the population of village I as a fraction of the total population of all
villages surveyed, and let χIt =
κItY∗It∑
I κItY∗It
be the share of sample-wide output it produces
under optimal within-village allocations. Let Zt =
∑
I χItZIt denote the output-weighted
mean and Z̃It deviations from the mean of village productivity. Let Et be sample-wide
allocative efficiency with reallocation still within villages. Trivial algebra shows Et =∑
I χItEIt, which means
Yt = Zt · Et ·
∑
I
Z̃ItκItF (KIt, TIt, LIt)
= ZtEtF ({KIt, TIt, LIt}) (1.5)
Since reallocation is within-village, the sample-wide aggregate production function de-
pends on the aggregate factor stocks of each village.









can decompose growth in per household rice output into the contributions of improvements
in productivity, improvements in factor allocations, and aggregate factor accumulation. By
setting gZt and g
E
t to zero, for example, I can examine how output would have grown if the
rice sector had made no improvements to productivity or efficiency.
1.4 Data
I construct my sample from the Townsend Thai Annual Household Survey (1997). The
Townsend Thai Project collected a baseline of households from four rural provinces using
a stratified design. The Project subsampled one third of the survey villages and resurveyed
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the sampled households every following year to construct a panel. It later added two more
provinces and sampled new households to counter attrition. I use the 1997 through 2009
rounds. The survey response period is June of the previous year through May, so I label the
period covered by the 1997 survey as 1996. The Project followed sixteen of the villages
excluded from the annual survey to collect the Townsend Thai Monthly Household Survey
(2012). I use the first two years of the monthly survey throughout the paper to confirm
facts not found in the annual survey. I use district-level precipitation data computed from
the University of Delaware Climactic Project and NASA’s Tropical Rainfall Measuring
Mission. I also test my micro measures of productivity in the Online Appendix using agro-
climactic suitability data from the FAO.
Land is the number of rai (6.25 rai = 1 acre) of paddy the household cultivated (whether
owned or otherwise). Labor is the sum of hired and family labor in days worked. Hired
labor is the household’s expenditures on farm workers divided by the median daily wage in
the village. Using the median wage is not ideal, but the survey does not ask directly about
the amount of labor hired and the within-village variation in unskilled wages is relatively
low (the coefficient of variation is less than 0.19 for most village-years). I count the number
of household members who report being unpaid family laborers with primary occupations
in farming of any sort (or who mention “FIELDS” in a freeform response). The annual
survey gives no information on the days each member worked. Instead I use the more
detailed labor data in the monthly survey to calculate the median days any individual works
on his family’s fields, and multiply the overall median—60 days—by the number of family
laborers counted in the annual data.
Capital is the sum of the value of owned mechanical capital, the value of owned buffalo,
and the imputed value of rented capital and expenses (including intermediate inputs). I
do not compute the value of owned capital using perpetual inventory because households
frequently report changes in capital ownership without reporting investment, either because
they forget to report the investment or because they receive the new machines as gifts
or inheritance. Instead I assign a purchase value to each asset the household owns. I
deflate and depreciate the purchase value of assets owned at baseline. For assets acquired
afterwards I use the purchase price. The survey only reports assets in classes, so if the
household has multiple assets of the same type I must treat them as if they have identical
value and use the most recent purchase price (most households own one or fewer assets of
any type). If I cannot identify a price I drop the asset from the calculation (I can identify a
price for the large majority). I then depreciate the purchase price to get the value in a given
year assuming 2 percent depreciation for structures (House and Shapiro, 2008), 10 percent
depreciation for machines, and (I treat them as vehicles) 20 percent depreciation for tractors
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(Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). Owned mechanical capital in a year is the total value of the
assets. I treat intermediate inputs—seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and fuel—as capital with
a 100 percent deprecation rate. I add maintenance, which I treat as investment that takes
immediate effect. I then add the purchase price of rented capital, which I approximate with
total rental expenses divided by an interest rate of .04 plus the average rate of deprecation
for all types of capital (a user cost). 12 Finally, I add the value the household reports for its
buffalo. Since households do not report whether they rented out their capital I cannot lower
it to reflect how much they actually use. The error might inflate estimated misallocation
because unproductive farmers who rent out their machinery will appear to have too much
capital.13
In Section 1.5.2 I model productivity using several catastrophes the household reports
about its income. I use indicators for illness, death in the family, flooding, problems with
crop-eating pests, poor rainfall, low yield for other reasons, and a low price for output. To
proxy for malnourishment I use the share of the household’s consumption budget devoted
to rice, the staple food, including the value of home-produced rice. Jensen and Miller
(2010) argue as households become less hungry they substitute away from the staple, so a
larger share implies more hunger. All monetary variables are deflated to 2005 Thai baht. I
describe all the variables in more detail in Appendix A.6.
Table 1.1 reports household-year averages of each variable for the sample. I restrict my
analysis to the households I observe with positive rice revenue and levels of all factors for
at least two years, as I cannot calculate a household fixed-effect for anyone else. At 2005
exchange rates the average annual revenue from rice was roughly 1200 dollars. Farms are
small and most farmers plant only 19.4 rai (3.1 acres) of paddy. The average household
spent only 40 percent of its annual budget on rice, a sign that hunger is not widespread
in my sample. Very few households report illness or deaths in the family relative to the
number who report aggregate (rainfall, floods, prices) or completely unanticipated (pests)
production shocks. It is reassuring that illness, the type of shock that might undermine my
decomposition (see Section 1.2), is rare.
12Given the presence of misallocation, how can I assume a common interest rate and a user cost? Recall
my objective is to construct a consistent measure of capital in terms of value. Reweighting using household-
specific interest rates would be equivalent to calling a tractor more valuable because the household renting it
pays a higher mortgage. Variation in the actual rental price is more problematic, but a relatively small fraction
of total capital is rented, making this less of a problem.
13The survey does ask households about “Payments for other rentals,” but the rented goods might not be





Revenue from rice 47918.6 Fraction who report. ..
(77327.9)
Capital 74560.7 Illness 0.01
(93826.4) Death in Family 0.01
Land 19.4 Flood 0.06
(15.9) Crop-Eating Pests 0.04
Labor 181.6 Bad Rainfall 0.22
(191.9) Low Yield for Other Reason 0.21
Rice Budget Share 0.4 Low Price 0.15
(0.2)
Households 775 Observations 6230
Villages 69
Note: I construct the sample in two steps: I first restrict it to household-years with positive revenue and positive capital,
land, and labor. I further restrict the sample to household with at least two years of positive revenue and factors. All
variables are annual. Revenue and capital are in 2005 baht, land in rai, and labor in human-days. The share of the
household’s consumption budget spent on rice is my measure of hunger.
1.5 Estimating the Production Function
I cannot use the expressions for optimal land, labor, and capital derived in Section 1.3
without an estimate of the production function. Estimating a production function is never
easy, and misallocations complicate the task because I cannot assume firms choose their
inputs optimally. As I explain, however, misallocation enables me to separately identify
each factor’s production share using a dynamic panel estimator.
1.5.1 Estimation with Misallocation
I assume in Section 1.2 that farmers make all their input choices with the same information
about within-village productivity. Ackerberg et al. (2006) explain why the assumption
might make identifying each factor’s production elasticity difficult. If a firm using Cobb-
Douglas technology selects all its inputs freely and simultaneously they will all be functions
of a single variable: anticipated productivity. Equation 1.3 shows that the farmer’s optimal
choices of (log) capital, land, and labor are all perfectly correlated. Ackerberg et al. solve
the problem by assuming the firm chooses factors optimally but at different times.
With imperfect markets the solution is simpler: the firm does not choose factors opti-
mally. If one farmer can rent tractors more cheaply than his neighbor they will use land and
capital in different proportions. Even relatively little variation (or misallocation) breaks the
perfect correlation between factors. To test whether markets are perfect, take Expression
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Table 1.2








Capital 0.006∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ -0.000
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Land -5.504∗∗∗ -299.477∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(1.60) (45.94) (0.00)
Labor -1.411∗∗ -1.080 -0.000
(0.44) (2.21) (0.00)
Observations 6230 6230 6230
Households 775 775 775
Note: Under perfect markets the ratios of factor choices should not be correlated
with anything after controlling for village-year fixed-effects. I report the results
of such regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the household level.









= vIt + εit
The land-capital ratio is a function of invariant parameters, noise, and prices that do
not vary within a village with perfect factor markets. If markets are perfect it should not
be correlated with anything—in particular, the levels of any factor—after controlling for
village-year fixed-effects. Table 1.2 shows that the capital-labor, capital-land, and land-
labor ratios are each strongly correlated with the level of at least one factor. I reject the null
in five of nine coefficients, which means I can reject perfect markets. Although the markets
cause little misallocation (see Section 1.6), they are imperfect enough to let me identify the
production function.
Imperfect markets do, however, rule out a class of methods Ackerberg et al. (2006)
call ”structural techniques.” The econometrician assumes the firm chooses intermediate
inputs to match its anticipated productivity. All else equal, more intermediate inputs imply
higher anticipated productivity. The assumption yields powerful results when satisfied:
the econometrician can non-parametrically estimate productivity. It is also why structural
techniques fail when factor markets fail. Take a concrete example and suppose two farmers
have the same amount of land, workers, machinery, and productivity. One is married to
the son of the local fertilizer merchant. She gets a discount on fertilizer and naturally buys
more. The econometrician wrongly concludes she is more productive than her clone. The
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structural techniques fail because they assume the farmer’s choices are only a function of
her productivity and not her constraints or privileges.14
1.5.2 Modeling Productivity
What makes one farmer more productive than another? Much of what determines a firm’s
revenue productivity in manufacturing or services—a successful marketing campaign, a
new product line, the monopoly power born of a competitor’s demise—are absent in agri-
culture. Many of the most obvious determinants of a farmer’s productivity—rainfall, crop-
eating pests, illness, accidental misapplication of fertilizer—either affect everyone in the
village or are unanticipated. As I argued in Section 1.2, Thai farmers have used modern
seeds, pesticides, and fertilizers for decades, so nobody has a technological edge. Land
quality does not appear to vary much within a village.15 Malnourishment might lower the
farmer’s productivity, and he certainly knows when he is hungry, so I construct a measure
of hunger. What remains is the farmer’s own managerial talent: his knowledge of how to
eke the most output from his inputs of land, labor, and capital. Managerial talent is a fixed
characteristic of the farmer I can capture in a household fixed-effect. I model anticipated
and unanticipated productivity as follow:





aSj [Dummy Shocks]j,it +
∑
k




aRm[Monthly Precipitation]m,it + [Overall Error]it
In the dummy shocks I include indicators for illness, death in the family, retirement,
flooding, problems with crop-eating pests, poor rainfall, low yield for other reasons, and a
low price for output. 16 Why do I call all aggregate shocks and (district-level) precipitation
unanticipated? For village-level reallocation the distinction does not matter: a village-level
shock will not affect the optimal allocation. But the distinction would change how much
growth I credit to anticipated versus unanticipated productivity in the aggregate output
14Ackerberg et al. would say the “scalar unobservable” assumption fails.
15I took the average price per rai as proxy for land quality and included it in unreported production function
estimates. The coefficient was small and insignificant, which I take to mean quality does not vary much and
price reflects location rather than fertility.
16Self-reports of bad rainfall and prices probably do not add much information to the district-level vari-
ables for precipitation and shocks, but I include them anyways to ensure I correctly estimate the production
function.
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decomposition of Section 1.3.5. I therefore combine both types of productivity into an
overall term in the decomposition.
The reader may doubt that I can ever know as much about the farmer’s productivity as
the farmer himself. In Section 1.8 I assess how much the main results change when farmers
anticipate all productivity.
1.5.3 Dynamic Panel Estimation
If the bulk of a farmer’s anticipated productivity is fixed, it seems natural to estimate
log yit = logAit + ˜log φit + θK logKit + θT log Tit + θL logLit + [Overall Error]it
with the within-household estimator, where ˜log φit = log φit − [Overall Error]it. But
the key assumption for its consistency—what Wooldridge (2002) calls strict exogeneity—
fails. Strict exogeneity requires that unexpectedly high or low output in either the past or
future will not affect a farmer’s input decisions today. But suppose a credit-constrained
farmer suffered a bad harvest last year and spent her savings on food, leaving less money to
rent land this year. Aside from potentially causing misallocations the situation also violates
strict exogeneity.
The Anderson-Hsiao estimator (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981, 1982) can estimate the pro-
duction function under a weaker assumption called sequential exogeneity. Sequential ex-
ogeneity assumes a farmer will not base her input decisions on unexpectedly high or low
future output, but makes no assumptions about past output. In other words, current and
future error terms are unanticipated shocks to productivity. I implement the estimator by
taking first-differences to eliminate the fixed-effect and instrumenting the differenced fac-
tors with their lagged levels. Lagged levels are uncorrelated with the combined error term
by sequential exogeneity, so the instruments are valid.
Table 1.3 reports the Anderson-Hsiao estimates of the production function. As ex-
pected, rice farming is relatively labor- and land-intensive. The production function has
decreasing returns, and each shock to productivity has the expected sign. The first-stage
regressions of factor changes on their lags easily satisfy the usual standards for strength




Production Elasticities Productivity Modifiers
Capital Hunger -0.032
-Share (θK) 0.110 (0.08)
(0.04) Illness -0.147∗
-1st Stage F-Stat 111.720 (0.08)
Death 0.029
Land (0.12)
-Share (θT ) 0.244 Flood -0.101∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04)
-1st Stage F-Stat 128.387 Pests -0.057
(0.04)
Labor Bad Rain -0.131∗∗∗
-Share (θL) 0.310 (0.03)
(0.04) Low Yield -0.152∗∗∗
-1st Stage F-Stat 133.424 (0.02)
Low Price -0.065∗∗∗
Returns to Scale: (0.02)
-Estimate (σ) 0.664
(0.07)
Households: 734 Observations: 4856
R-Squared: 0.760 Cragg-Donald Stat. 204.435
Note: The table reports the Anderson-Hsiao estimates of the production elasticities and the effects of each
component of productivity (see Section 1.5.3 for details). I cluster standard errors by household.
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Table 1.4
Sample Sizes and Productivity in Rice-Farming Villages
Farmers Per Village Productivity Dispersion
25th Pctl. 5 75/25 1.81
50th Pctl. 9 90/10 3.09
75th Pctl. 12 95/5 3.64
Table 1.5
Correlates of Under-Allocated Farmers
Correlates of Being Under-Allocated in 1996
Age of Head Rents Land? Years Farmed Rice Illness High Risk Aversion Cash Savings
-0.6** -2.3 -0.5** -4.6 11.2** 0.0
I define “under-allocated” to mean the household produces more after reallocation than before. I regress a dummy for
being under-allocated in the first year (1996) on a set of variables that might cause a household to be allocated too much
or too little. The table reports the coefficients and significance levels from the regression. After dropping households for
whom all variables are not defined the sample size is 350.
1.5.4 Sample Characteristics
Table 1.4 reports sample sizes and median productivity dispersion among the villages of
my sample. The median 90/10 ratio for productivity within a village is 3.09, a number close
to the range of 1 to 3 that Gandhi et al. (2011) find for the gross production functions of
several manufacturing industries in Colombia and Chile. Productivity in a rice-farming vil-
lage is distributed much like in a typical manufacturing industry. Hsieh and Klenow (2009)
find much larger 90/10 ratios in their sample, most likely because they use value-added
rather than gross production functions. Gandhi et al. show that value-added representa-
tions require strong assumptions about gross production functions and tend to inflate the
dispersion of productivity by an order of magnitude.
1.6 Results
I plug the estimates of production elasticities and anticipated productivity into the expres-
sions for fully perfect and perfect factor market allocations: (1.3) and (1.4) for capital and
similar expressions for land and labor. I drop all observations from village-years with only
a single farmer because they by construction have no within-village misallocation.17
Table 1.5 reports predictors of being under-allocated in the earliest year as per a linear
probability regression. I call a farmer under-allocated if he produces more after reallocation
than before, and predict under-allocation with the farmer’s age and years farming rice,
17The sample loses 13 households, 8 villages, and 47 observations.
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whether he rents land, whether illness lowered his income, his cash savings, and whether
he chose the most risk-averse options in two questions that measure risk preferences.18
Ten more years of age or experience reduce by 6 and 5 percentage points the chance of
being under-allocated, suggesting farmers accumulate factors as they age. As expected, a
risk-averse farmer is 11.2 percentage points more likely to be under-allocated. A farmer
who fears risk is less likely to gamble on a large farm even if he is more talented than his
neighbors. Savings do not predict under-allocation, perhaps because they may equally be a
sign of wealth or unwillingness to invest.
I then estimate the misallocation in each village using the expression for GI in Section
1.3.4 and plot the distribution in Figure 1.2.A. Even in the earliest year of my sample
(1996) the total cost of factor and financial market failures was less than 15 percent in
most villages. Over time the distribution shifts downward, and misallocation falls below
8 percent for most villages by 2008. Many villages appear to have negative misallocation
because estimated misallocation is a random variable. When true misallocation is low the
probability a normally distributed estimator falls below zero is high.
To reduce the noise and represent the whole rice sector, Figure 1.2.B depicts misalloca-
tion across all villages from the original four provinces surveyed at baseline.19 I estimate
the gains in sample-wide output from reallocating factors within each village after weight-
ing by population (see Section 1.3.5). Sample-wide misallocation is never more than 17
percent and falls to below 4 percent by 2008. The results suggest factor and financial mar-
ket failures do not produce much costly misallocation, and what little they do produce falls
over time.
Figure 1.2.B also separates the misallocation caused by imperfect factor markets from
that caused by imperfect financial markets. I calculate GFACTI and G
FIN
I as defined in
Section 1.3.5 and reweight them to the sample-level. Both types of misallocation fall from
1996 to 2008. Since the factor market measure is a lower bound while the financial market
measure is an upper bound, neither market unambiguously causes more misallocation until
2006 when financial market misallocation drops to nearly zero. Development economists
often blame the financial markets for underdevelopment, but the graph suggests factor mar-
kets cause as much or even more misallocation. Like in Figure 1.2.A, the apparently nega-
tive financial market misallocation in 2008 is an artifact of sampling error. If true financial
18Each question asked whether he would accept a gamble that could with equal probability double or
reduce to two-thirds his current income. If he refused he was offered a similar gamble where the worse
outcome would give 80 percent of his current income. I mark the farmer as highly risk averse if he refused
both offers. The question was first asked in the 2003 survey, so I linked the 2003 response to the 1996 status
of under-allocation.
19I restrict the sample to households from the original four provinces surveyed at baseline to avoid the
artificial jump that comes from adding a new province partway through.
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Figure 1.2
Panel A: Density of Within-Village Misallocation; Panel B: Sample-Level Overall,
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Year
Gains, Overall
Gains, Factor Market Perfection (Lower-Bound)
Gains, Subsequent Financial Market Perfection (Upper-Bound)
Sample Gains from Market Perfection
Note: Panel A plots the shifting distribution of misallocation within each village . I report misallocation as the fraction of observed
output foregone because factors are misallocated. Panel B calculates the overall cost to the rice sector from misallocation within villages
for every year of my sample. It also splits overall misallocation into misallocation from factor versus financial markets, where my
measures bound the gains from perfecting first the factor markets and then the financial markets.
market misallocation is almost zero the probability of estimating it to be negative is large.
The estimator for financial market misallocation is also more volatile than the estimator
for factor market misallocation, so the apparent contrast between the slow march of factor
markets versus the drunken stumble of financial markets may be an artifact.
Figure 1.3 decomposes growth in the four provinces into changes in aggregate factor
stocks F (·), revenue productivity Z, and the efficiency of factor allocations E. Each line
shows how log output would have grown since 1996 if some parts of growth had been
shut down. The solid line shows output if productivity and efficiency were fixed at their
1996 level and only aggregate factor stocks changed. Without growth in productivity and
efficiency, rice output would have fallen since 1996 as factors flowed out of rice farming.
Since Thailand has rapidly industrialized over the past two decades, agriculture’s decline is
not surprising. The middle dashed line shows growth if changes in productivity are turned
back on, and comparing it to the solid line shows the contribution of productivity to growth.
Rising productivity since 1998 overwhelmed the outflow of factors and produced net gains
in rice revenue. It rose for two reasons: better yields and higher prices. Average yields
might have improved as less productive farmers left farming and those who stayed became
more skilled, but the spike in productivity after 2006 comes entirely from rising food prices.
The final line in Figure 1.3 shows output when changes in efficiency are turned back on,
and comparing it to the middle dashed line shows the contribution of improving efficiency
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Figure 1.3
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Year
Aggregate Output Decomposition, Sample
Note: I decompose aggregate output and compute changes in the log of the aggregate factor stocks F (·), revenue productivity Z, and
the efficiency of factor allocations E. Each line plots the counterfactual change in output holding all components except the indicated
component fixed (so the lowest line holds average productivity and allocative efficiency fixed while letting aggregate factor stocks
change).
to output growth. It is trivial. Compared to the other two sources of growth, efficiency
barely changed the trajectory of rice output.
Why do I find so much less misallocation than earlier work (e.g. Hsieh and Klenow,
2009)? One possibility is that markets in agriculture really are more efficient than in manu-
facturing. The possibility contradicts popular perception that rural villages are backwards,
although Townsend (1994) and Benjamin (1992) find surprising efficiency in rural insur-
ance and labor markets. Another possibility is that equally bad markets cause more misallo-
cation in manufacturing than in farming because some feature of manufacturing production
makes misallocations more costly. One possibility is that productivity is more dispersed
in manufacturing, but I show in Section 1.5.4 that productivity is no less dispersed in a
Thai village than a typical manufacturing industry.20 More generally, the distribution of
village-level misallocation in Figure 1.2 shows that some villages have lots of misalloca-
tion (nearly 60 percent), demonstrating that costly misallocation is possible in my context;
it simply does not happen often. A third possibility is that most misallocation in earlier
studies did not come from factor and financial market failures. For example, studies like
20Another possibility is that manufacturing has higher returns-to-scale that make misallocation more costly.
Consider a simple example: two firms that produce only with capital. Suppose K∗1 and K
∗
2 are the optimal




















σ 0 which is negative because the marginal
products are equal at the optimum, and Firm 1 has more capital than is optimal while Firm 2 has less. So
efficiency falls faster for higher returns-to-scale, and equivalently misallocation rises faster.
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Hsieh and Klenow’s import to poor countries parameters calibrated with U.S. data. If rich
country production differs from poor country production and the difference grows with the
gap in development, then poorer countries might seem to have more misallocation. That
may be why Midrigan and Xu (2013) could not explain much misallocation with financial
market constraints. Perhaps little of the misallocation Hsieh and Klenow find in India and
China comes from factor and financial market failures, an unexpected result given how
much attention they receive in the literature on development.
1.7 The Effect of Credit on Misallocation: The Million
Baht Program
Between May 2001 and May 2002 the Thai government gave the public lending funds of all
the villages in my sample one million baht. The aptly named Million Baht Program in effect
gave smaller villages more credit per-household. Kaboski and Townsend (2011) explain
that village boundaries have little economic meaning and come from a bureaucratic tangle
with statistically random outcomes. Since village sizes are random the per-household rise
in credit is also random, and Kaboski and Townsend verify there are no differential trends
between the villages that received more or less credit (see Table I on p. 1369 of their paper).
I exploit the program to test my measures of efficiency. By increasing the supply of
credit the program improved financial markets and should decrease misallocation from
financial market imperfections. 21 I regress a village’s misallocation in each year on year
dummies, village fixed-effects, the log of the per-household credit injection (one million
divided by the number of households), and the interaction between the log credit injection
and 2001, the year of implementation, and 2002, the year after. The coefficients on the
interactions measure the semi-elasticities of misallocation with respect to credit.
Table 1.6 reports the results, which are rescaled to show the change in the dependent
variable due to a one percent increase in per household credit. A one percent increase
in credit decreases misallocation by .1 percent of observed output, nearly all of which
comes from decreases in financial market misallocation. Since a credit intervention should
affect financial markets, the results validate my measures of factor versus financial market
misallocation. The program had no significant effect on aggregate land, labor, or capital,
confirming Townsend and Kaboski’s (2009; 2011) finding that the program did not affect
average investment. If the average did not change but misallocation fell, most households
21The program might increase misallocation if the village funds lent out credit unfairly. But as Kaboski
and Townsend (2011) explain, villagers elected panels of managers to administer the funds. The decisions
were transparent and the main criterion was whether the managers thought the borrower could repay the loan.
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Table 1.6
Effects of the Million Baht Credit Intervention
Overall Cost Cost, Fact. Cost, Fin. Agg. K Agg. T Agg. L
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Log of Credit 0.002 -0.002 0.003 9.766 0.191∗∗∗ 0.542
(0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (494.52) (0.06) (0.72)
2001 X Credit -0.095∗∗ -0.002 -0.093∗∗ -396.228 0.114 -0.343
(0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (432.99) (0.08) (1.34)
2002 X Credit -0.028 0.006 -0.034 -221.249 -0.031 -0.147
(0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (583.20) (0.09) (1.58)
Year FEs X X X X X X
Village FEs X X X X X X
Villages 65.000 65.000 65.000 65.000 65.000 65.000
Observations 735.000 735.000 735.000 735.000 735.000 735.000
All standard errors clustered by village
Note: The table captures the causal effects of the credit intervention on misallocation. Log of Credit is the log of the per-household
credit injection ( one million
# of households
), and the program was implemented in 2001 and 2002. The coefficient on the interactions gives the
percentage point decrease in misallocation caused by a 1 percent increase in per household credit availability. A 1 percent increase
in credit reduces overall misallocation by .09 percentage points, and almost all of the effect came from a reduction in misallocation
from financial market failures (third column) rather than factor market failures (second column). The program had no effect on (per
household) aggregate factor stocks.
must have cut back their scale while the most productive farmers scaled up. Kaboski and
Townsend’s structural model similarly showed the program did not affect all households
equally.
Though statistically significant, the effect is small. Even a fifty percent increase in credit
would only reduce misallocation by five percentage points. With so little misallocation at
baseline the result is not surprising. Improving financial markets that do not cause much
misallocation will not produce spectacular results. But whatever the program’s effects, they
seem to have faded by its second year. The interaction of average credit injected and the
year after implementation (2002) is a third the size and insignificant. One possibility is
that households changed how they used their credit in the second year of the program. But
recall that measured misallocation is noisy, making the estimated program effect noisy. The




Panel A: Sample-Wide Misallocation When All Productivity is Anticipated; Panel B:
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Note: Panel A plots misallocation using the breakdown between anticipated and unanticipated productivity in the main text next to
misallocation assuming all productivity is anticipated. Panel B plots misallocation assuming reallocation within villages (as in the main
text) next to misallocation with reallocation within sub-districts (tambons), most of which contain four villages.
1.8 Robustness
1.8.1 Do Farmers Anticipate More Productivity than Assumed?
I must make assumptions about how much productivity the farmer anticipates to avoid
blaming factor and financial markets for random events. If I underestimate how much the
farmer knows about his productivity, however, I will underestimate the amount of misallo-
cation. I can bound the bias by recalculating misallocation under an extreme assumption:
farmers anticipate all productivity. The allocation I calculate by subbing Aitφit in for Ait in
expression (1.3) will produce an unrealistically perfect outcome because it assumes farmers
know everything: not just their own managerial talent, but also how much of the harvest
rats will eat in three months. Given even the extreme upper-bound on misallocation, do I
find as much misallocation as Hsieh and Klenow (2009)?
Figure 1.4.A, which compares the upper bound to my preferred specification, suggests
otherwise. Misallocation is higher in all years but still falls short in most years of the 40 to
60 percent Hsieh and Klenow report India could gain from reallocating to U.S. efficiency,
much less the 100 percent it could get with perfect efficiency. By the end of the sample mis-
allocation costs less than 20 percent of observed output—half of what Hsieh and Klenow
find for the U.S.
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Table 1.7








Note: I regress efficiency and gains from reallocation with the village on the num-
ber of farmers in the village in my sample. I exclude villages with only one farmer
(they have zero misallocation by construction). I find no evidence that small sam-
ples bias me towards finding too little misallocation. I cluster standard errors at
the village-level.
1.8.2 Does a Small Sample Cause Underestimates of Misallocation?
Misallocation often happens because the most talented producers do not get enough factors.
If very talented farmers are rare they might not appear in my small per-village samples and
I might underestimate misallocation. Even if the social planner favors reallocating every-
thing to a small productive elite, I show in Section 1.5.4 that the dispersion of productivity
in most villages is similar to what Gandhi et al. (2011) find in manufacturing industries.
Table 1.7 reports regressions of efficiency on sample size. Estimated efficiency is no lower
in villages with larger samples, and equivalently the gains from reallocation are no higher
in villages with larger samples (if anything, they are lower). The results give no reason to
fear I would find more misallocation if my sample were larger. In Figure 1.4.B I recalcu-
late sample-wide misallocation assuming I can reallocate factors between villages within
a sub-district. The procedure does not differ much from within-village reallocation ex-
cept I must account for the sample design (see Appendix A.2). Since sub-districts contain
several villages they have larger samples of farmers. Reallocating within sub-district also
increases the potential gains because the social planner can reallocate between as well as
within villages. Figure 1.4.B shows the combined effect of both forces is small. Reallocat-
ing between villages does not much increase misallocation. Sample size is not a problem,
and between-village misallocation is small relative even to within-village misallocation.
1.9 Conclusion
Imperfect factor and financial markets do not cause much misallocation among Thai rice
farmers. Of the little they do cause, factor markets cause as much or more than financial
markets. Declining misallocation makes positive but trivial contributions to growth in ag-
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gregate rice output, whereas most growth is caused by the overall flow of factors out of rice
production and an overall increase in average farm productivity. The Thai government’s
Million Baht credit program did raise efficiency through the expected channel: a statis-
tically significant decrease in misallocation from poor financial markets. But the effects
were small, most likely because there was so little misallocation to begin with.
The results do not mean misallocation never matters or market failures have no costs.
The assumptions behind my method might hold for other crops and other countries, but that
does not mean applying it to India or Africa would reveal as little misallocation as I find in
Thailand. It is also possible, as I discussed in Section 1.6, that factor and financial market
failures cause more misallocation outside agriculture. Finding little misallocation within
rice farming is not the same as finding little misallocation between farming and industry,
and Jeong and Townsend (2007),Buera et al. (2011), and Midrigan and Xu (2013) seem to
find between-sector misallocations do matter. Even among Thai farmers, I find in Shenoy
(2014b) that risk causes costly under-specialization in economic activities.
What the results do suggest is that evidence of a market failure is not always evidence
of costly misallocation. Only by measuring the costs of each type of misallocation caused
by each market failure can we know when and where misallocation really matters.
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CHAPTER 2
Risky Income or Lumpy Investments? Testing
Two Theories of Under-Specialization
2.1 Introduction
To take...the trade of the pin-maker...One man draws out the wire, another
straights it, a third cuts it...ten persons, therefore, could make among them
upwards of forty-eight thousand pins in a day...But if they had all wrought
separately and independently...they certainly could not each of them have made
twenty, perhaps not one pin in a day...
-Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations
The idea that specialization is efficient is as old as economics itself. The puzzle, then,
is to explain why households in poor countries rarely specialize in a single business or a
single job (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007). If entering multiple economic activities is costly,
why would the world’s poorest people fail to specialize?
This paper tests two well-known but unproven theories for why the poor have so many
economic activities: the theory of risky income and the theory of lumpy investments. The
theory of risky income compares a poor household choosing economic activities to an
investor choosing stocks. Like stocks the activities of the poor have risky returns, driving
households to diversify their portfolio even though expanding it is costly. Whereas this
theory blames under-specialization on a lack of insurance, the theory of lumpy investments
blames a lack of credit. The theory posits that households must make a large investment—
tailors must buy a sewing machine and bakers must buy an oven—before expanding any
business to its optimal scale. Households that cannot borrow enough to create one large
business must cobble together income from many small businesses.
30
From a simple model I derive four tests of the theory of risky income. Each household
has a primary activity and pays a fixed cost to enter any side activity. The returns to these
activities are random and not perfectly correlated. Therefore the theory’s first test is that
a rise in the riskiness of the primary activity causes a risk-averse household to self-insure
by entering more side activities. But since labor spent on side activities is labor taken from
the primary activity, a rise in the average return to the primary activity raises the cost of
self-insurance. The theory’s second test is that a rise in the return to the primary activity
causes the household to exit side activities.
The third test, which uses revenue from side activities rather than total revenue to check
whether specialization is efficient, is critical for two reasons. First, my empirical approach
rules out any test using total revenue. Second, the household reallocates labor between
activities when it enters new activities. For both reasons I cannot identify the fixed cost of
entering a new activity, the clearest sign of inefficient under-specialization. I can, however,
derive the optimal allocation of labor as a function of the number of activities, and use
this allocation to find the change in side revenue caused when the household enters a new
activity. I show that if the change is negative then specialization is inefficient, though the
converse need not hold.
To run these tests I study how rice farmers in Thailand respond to volatility in the
international price of rice. Using a monthly panel I identify the households who expect
a rice harvest in the next three months. Higher volatility in the price of rice raises the
riskiness of these farmers’ income. By comparing their response to the response of farmers
who do not expect a harvest I identify the causal effect of riskier income on specialization.
By likewise comparing how the two groups respond to changes in the expected price I
identify the causal effect of greater returns on specialization. My first two tests confirm the
theory of risky income. Greater risk drives households into more activities while higher
returns tempt households out of activities. After adjusting for how well international prices
predict local prices, my baseline estimates suggest a 21 percent rise in volatility causes a
household to enter an extra activity.
Since a household that expects a harvest next month sells no rice this month the mean
and variance of the rice price change the number of activities without directly affecting
current revenue. I use this change to instrument for the number of activities. Households
expecting a harvest do not yet have the revenue from their primary activity, ruling out any
test of whether additional activities decrease total revenue. But my third test shows that
if additional activities decrease revenue from side activities then a failure to specialize is
inefficient. Two-stage least squares confirms exactly that.
Finally, I test the theory of lumpy investments. The theory predicts that households
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with easier access to credit can afford the lumpy investments that let them specialize in
one business. I test whether households exit activities after a government program creates
random variation in the availability of credit, but find no evidence that credit increases
specialization.
Existing work links risk to under-specialization but lacks the exogenous variation needed
to show that risk causes under-specialization.1 Morduch (1990) shows that households
more vulnerable to income shocks tend to diversify their crops, and Bandyopadhyay and
Skoufias (2012) find that households in areas with riskier weather tend to have spouses with
different occupations. But since vulnerability and weather risk are not exogenous, house-
holds who endure these problems may endure other problems unrelated to the riskiness of
their income. If these other problems also cause under-specialization then estimates of the
effect of risk on specialization will be biased.
More recent work, on the other hand, uses exogenous variation but does not study the
effect of risk on specialization. Karlan et al. (2012) find that randomly assigned weather
insurance increases both investment and the proportion of land planted with crops sensi-
tive to rain, but they do not study specialization. Adhvaryu et al. (2013) study whether
households expand their number of activities in response to shocks, but entering activities
in response to shocks is not the same as entering activities in anticipation of risk.
Unlike the existing literature, this paper uses plausibly exogenous variation to identify
whether risk causes costly under-specialization. I identify the effect of ex ante risk rather
than ex post shocks. Finally, to my knowledge this paper is the first to test the theory of
lumpy investment alongside the theory of risky income, letting me assess which theory has
more merit.
2.2 Theory: A Model of Risky Income
2.2.1 Deriving Tests for the Theory
Each household has one primary economic activity and may enter any number of side
activities. The household pays a fixed cost for each side activity. It allocates one unit of
labor between all activities. Labor produces a constant return, and the household does not
know the return to any activity until after it has made its choices.
1Many more papers study how imperfect insurance drives households to make other inefficient choices.
Those most relevant to this paper whether farmers with riskier profits marry their daughters to men in dif-
ferent occupations (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989), choose safer but less profitable bundles of investments
(Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Bliss and Stern, 1982), or delay the planting of their crops (Walker and
Ryan, 1990, p. 256).
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The household must first choose the number of side activities. Then it chooses the allo-
cations of labor. Then the returns to the side activities are realized. Finally, the household
learns the return to its primary activity and consumes.














where α is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, M ≥ 0 is the number of side
activities, and Lp and {Ls,m}m∈M are the labor allocated to the primary and each side
activity. The household consumes its revenue, which is the sum of revenue from primary
(p) and side (s) activities minus fixed costs. The primary and side activities yield returns
wp and {ws,m}m∈M , which are independent normal random variables with wp ∼ N(w̄p, σ2p)
andws,m ∼ N(w̄s, σ2s) for eachm.2 Assume the side activities yield weakly lower expected
returns: w̄p ≥ w̄s. Also assume the average premium to the primary activity, w̄+ = w̄p−w̄s,
is not too large: w̄+ < ασ2p . If this assumption fails the household will specialize despite
the risk.
I make many simplifying assumptions about functional forms, but the important results
rest on four crucial assumptions. First, the household is risk-averse. Second, the house-
hold cannot perfectly smooth its consumption through insurance or savings. (To sharpen
the model’s predictions I assume the household has no insurance or savings.) Third, the
returns to side activities are not perfectly correlated with returns to the primary activity.
Fourth, each activity has (locally) increasing returns. The first two assumptions force the
household to insure itself against risk without using financial markets. The third assump-
tion makes under-specialization a form of insurance. The fourth assumption makes under-
specialization costly.
2If the returns to side and primary activities were not independent, the properties of normal random
variables let me write the returns to each side activity as ws,m = ρmwp + ξm for some correlation coefficient
ρm. If I then re-label variables accordingly, all the results should go through. I only need the returns to be
imperfectly correlated.
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To get the intuition of the model, consider the simple case where the household either
specializes (M = 0) or has one side activity (M = 1). The household chooses between
two “bundles” of average consumption C̄ and variance of consumption V :
M = 0 M = 1
C̄ w̄p w̄p − w̄+(1− Lp)− F
V σ2p (Lp)
2σ2p + (1− Lp)2σ2s
Since Lp < 1, w̄+ > 0 and F > 0 the household can lower the variance of its consump-
tion by entering a side activity if it accepts a lower expected consumption.
Suppose the household enters a side activity and must now choose how much labor to
shift from the primary activity. Since consumption is a normal random variable, expected






























To derive predictions about aggregate statistics, suppose the fixed cost of entering the
side activity varies across households because some find it easier to enter activities. For
example, two rice farmers might differ only in how closely they live to a construction site
where they can find part-time work. For simplicity suppose F ∼ U [0,F ] for some upper-
bound F .
For any amount of risk there is a household whose fixed cost makes it indifferent be-
tween zero and one side activity. Call that household’s fixed-cost F̄0. Let C(M) and V (M)
be the mean and variance of consumption as functions of the number of side activities.
Then F̄0 is defined as the fixed cost that makes this equation hold:
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Figure 2.1






Fraction who enter a side activity 
Suppose F has a uniform distribution over [0, Ƒ] 
𝐹 0 
A rise in the variance of the primary activity… 
𝐹 0 
…causes a rise in the maximal cost households are willing to pay… 
…and causes the average number of activities to rise 
Note: M is the number of side activities; F̄0 the threshold fixed cost for moving from zero to one side activity; σ2p is the variance of the
primary economic activity. A rise in the variance raises the threshold fixed cost, which is how much households will to pay for insurance,
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[V (0)− V (1)] = C̄(0)− C̄(1)











Households who pay fixed costs above the threshold F̄0 will specialize while those
below enter a side activity. The threshold rises with the variance of the primary activity σ2p ,
and Figure 2.1 shows the effect on the number of households with a side activity. When
their primary activity becomes riskier, households are willing to pay a bigger fixed cost to
make their revenue less risky. The threshold F̄0 rises, and the mass of households with fixed
costs between the old and new thresholds enter a side activity. The change in the average




























(Recall that by assumption ασ2p − w+ > 0). Similarly we can derive the change in the
average number of activities when the average return to the primary activity rises. Since a
rise in the expected return makes under-specialization more costly, the threshold will fall
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The intuition of the case where M ∈ {0, 1} holds for any number of activities M ∈
{0, 1, 2, . . .}, and the simple but tedious proof is left for Appendix [X].
Taking on additional side activities lowers the household’s expected total revenue. But
the empirical approach of Section 2.3 studies rice farmers who expect but have not yet
collected a harvest. These farmers do not have their total revenue, ruling out any test
based on total revenue. I must instead derive the model’s predictions about what under-
specialization does to revenue from side activities; that is, what happens to the rice farmer’s
revenue from cassava when he starts baking bread.
Consider the household’s revenue just before it gets the output from its primary activity.





For simplicity treat the number of activities M as continuous. Holding a household’s
cost of additional activities fixed, a small increase in the number of activities changes side


















[−MF + (1− Lp)w̄s]
]
= −E[F ] +−w̄s
∂Lp
∂M
The average change in side revenue, which corresponds to the instrumental variables
coefficient estimated in Section 2.5.1, has two parts: the average fixed cost of a side activity
and the effect on side revenue of shifting labor to the side activities. Since an all-else-equal
increase in the number of activities makes the portfolio of side activities less risky, the
household wants to shift labor away from its primary activity. Then ∂Lp
∂M
< 0 and the second
term is positive. If large enough it will swamp the cost of under-specialization and make
the derivative (and thus the instrumental variables estimate) positive. To see why, suppose
the household starts with no side activities and thus no revenue from side activities. If
the variance of the primary activity rises sharply and the cost of entering a side activity
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is small, then the household will want to enter the side activity. Then revenue from side
activities will have increased, and though the increase might be small compared to what the
household loses from its primary activity, the coefficient I estimate will be positive. Thus
a negative estimate is sufficient evidence that activities (and thus under-specialization) is
costly, but it is not necessary evidence. This arguement ignores the direct effect that my
instruments, the variance and the average returns, have on the labor allocation. But as I
show in the proof in Appendix B.1, the direct effect only reinforces the result.
The model also makes a prediction about the ordinary least squares coefficient, which
estimates the average effect of increasing the number of activities without holding their















































is clearly negative; a higher fixed cost will lower revenue. The term
∂
∂M
E [F |M ] gives the selection bias. It captures the difference in fixed cost paid by house-
holds who select into many versus few activities. As Figure 2.2 illustrates, it is also nega-
tive. Since a household takes up a large number of activities if it pays a small fixed cost, the




















To summarize, the model gives four tests for the theory of risky income:
Test 1 (Risk) Households enter activities when the returns to their primary activity get
riskier.
3Indeed, E [F |M ] is just the demand curve for insurance through under-specialization. Like any demand
curve its slope is negative.
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Figure 2.2
Why is OLS Upward-Biased?
Ƒ 𝐹 0 
1/Ƒ 
M=0 M=1 M=2 M=3 M>3 
E[F | M=0] E[F | M=1] 
E[F | M=2] 
E[F | M=3] 
E[F ] 
F 
E[F | M] 
M 
0 1 2 3 
As the number of activities rises… 
…the expected cost falls. 
𝐹 1 𝐹 2 𝐹 3 
Note: M is the number of side activities; F̄m is the threshold fixed cost below which a household moves fromm tom+1 side activities.
A household only enters many activities if its fixed cost low, so the number of activities predicts a household’s costs. The costs of extra
activities appear in the error term of a regression of side revenue on number of activities, so the coefficient on number of activities is
biased upwards.
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Test 2 (Return) Households exit activities when the (expected) returns to their primary
activity rise.
Test 3 (Cost) The average effect of more activities on revenue is negative only if under-
specialization is costly.
Test 4 (OLS Bias) Compared to the IV estimate, the OLS estimate of the effect of more
activities on side revenue is biased positively.
2.2.2 Modeling and Measuring Expectations about Risk
To run these tests I must model rice farmers’ expectations about the returns and volatility
of the price of rice. Suppose the household makes its choices at the beginning of period t.
It has not yet observed the price wpt and must form its expectation w̄pt using only infor-
mation from the past. Suppose the monthly price follows the Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model of Engle (1982) with one modification: I assume the
level of the price follows a random walk. The assumption reduces the number of parame-
ters I must estimate and, as I show below, matches the true series well. Then
wpt = wp,t−1 + εt
εt = zt
√
ht, zt ∼ N(0, 1)
ht = τ0 + τ1ε
2
t−1.
At the beginning of period t, the household expects a return of w̄pt = E[wpt] = wp,t−1. The
variance of the return is σ2pt = V (wpt) = V (εt) = ht = τ0 + τ1εt−1. I estimate the model
using conditional maximum likelihood.4 The predicted value ĥ is a consistent estimate of
the true conditional variance.
In practice I must make several simplifications when I use this measure. I cannot use
the actual expected volatility of the price at harvest because the empirical design in Section
2.3 compares farmers expecting a harvest to non-farmers and farmers who do not expect a
harvest. Since I cannot define the volatility at the time of harvest for non-farmers I must use
the current volatility. This creates measurement error and may bias my estimates towards
zero. I also measure volatility using the conditional standard deviation
√
h rather than the
conditional variance to make the coefficients on the volatility of the price and the expected
price comparable.
4The true distribution of zt need not be normal; the (quasi) maximum likelihood estimator based on a
normal distribution is still consistent.
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Figure 2.3


























































Rice Price and Predicted Mean and Volatility
Note: I plot the actual rice price together with the predicted rice price and the predicted volatility (square root of the predicted conditional
variance) from the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model. The red lines mark the start and end of the panel data.
Figure 2.3 plots the actual price of rice, the predicted mean, and the predicted standard
deviation. Simple though it is, the random walk assumption makes very accurate predic-
tions about the mean. A regression of price on its lag gives a coefficient of .995. The red
lines mark the start and end of the time period covered in the monthly panel data. The
sample spans a time when prices are relatively stable, ending well before the massive food
price spike of 2008. 5
2.3 Empirical Design: Implementing the Tests
2.3.1 Estimating Risk Response
Changes in the international price of rice—and the responses they evoke in Thai rice
farmers—provide the exogenous variation in risk I need to test the model. Between plant-
ing and harvest the price can change drastically, and anecdotal evidence suggests farmers
follow it closely in newspapers, radio broadcasts, and television reports. Since most of
my sample grows at least some of the white rice and jasmine rice that make Thailand the
5The econometrically-minded may worry if regressions on a regressor generated from a time series model
are consistent. Pagan (1984) confirms that the ARCH predicted value (though not the residual) will give




Rice Prices and Sales
(1) (2)
Avg. Transaction Price Rice Sold







Note: Column 1 — The dependent variable is the sample-wide average price of a kilogram of rice based on actual transactions, and
the independent variable is the international price of rice in baht per kilogram. Not all survey rounds include any sales of rice—hence
the number of observations is smaller than the number of survey rounds. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Column 2 —
The unit of observation is the household-month conditional on positive rice harvest.
world’s biggest rice exporter, the international price matters.6 In Column 1 of Table 2.1 I
report the correlation between the sample-wide average price farmers receive and the inter-
national price. Though not perfect, the correlation is significant and large enough to make
following the international price worth a farmer’s time. If prices become more volatile the
farmers know it and know the value of their harvest has become riskier.
A response to volatility need not be a response to risky income unless it comes from
a specific group of farmers: those who harvest soon. Simply comparing the response of a
rice farmer to someone who does not farm rice might just measure how rice farmers differ
in their attitude to risk. Observing a household with rice planted but not yet harvested—a
farmer expecting a harvest in the next three months —isolates the effect of risky income.
Farmers harvest rice roughly four months after planting and cannot hasten or delay the date.
Harvesting too soon yields immature grains while harvesting too late risks losses to pests.
The International Rice Research Institute states that “the ideal harvest time lies between
130 and 136 days after sowing for late” varieties and gives similarly narrow windows for
other varieties (Gummert and Rickman, 2011). Leaving rice on the stalk to wait out low
prices is not an option.
Although in principle a farmer might store rice after harvesting, threshing, and drying,
in practice the farmers in my sample sell most of their rice as soon as they harvest it.
Colum 2 of Table 2.1 reports the correlation between how much rice a household sells
6As expected, I find in unreported regressions that farmers harvesting only sticky rice have a lower re-
sponse. The negative response too large to be the all-else-equal effect of growing rice that will not be ex-
ported. Households who grow only sticky rice are unusual, their response may differ from that of other
farmers for reasons beyond the type of rice.
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Figure 2.4
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Note: Among rice expecting a harvest, I compare the response when rice prices are (A) stable to when they are (B) volatile. Since I use
household fixed-effects I effectively compare each farmer to himself.
and how much it harvests conditional on harvesting any during the month. It suggests
farmers sell almost every kilogram of rice as soon as it comes from their fields. Households
either cannot arbitrage—perhaps because millers and other middlemen only buy at certain
times—or they need cash too desperately to wait.
The farmers in my sample are too small to affect the international price and they cannot
delay their harvest. After controlling for the responses of non-rice farmers and rice farmers
not expecting a harvest, any additional response a farmer makes to higher volatility just
before her harvest must be caused by riskier income. Since I have a panel I can also control
for household fixed-effects to eliminate any fixed source of bias.7 The regression I run will
actually compare the farmer to herself at times when prices are volatile but she expects
no harvest, and times when she expects a harvest but prices are not volatile. Figure 2.4
illustrates the specification.
When prices become volatile the farmer must decide whether to shift her efforts away
from maximizing the upcoming harvest. Figure 2.5 graphs the average household labor that
rice farmers devote to their fields in the months before and after harvest. Bringing a rice
crop to harvest requires constant effort right up through harvest. Working as a laborer or
planting cassava detracts from rice farming just like that model assumes extra side activities
detract from the primary activity.
To estimate the response I run the regression
7For example, suppose only rich farmers plant in January to harvest in April. If the rice price always turns
volatile in March, I might just estimate the effect of being a rich farmer. If seasonal selection and seasonal
volatility matter, fixed-effects will deal with them.
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Figure 2.5
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Note: The figure shows how many days the average household works in its fields in the months before and after a rice harvest. More
precisely, I plot the coefficients of a regression of the number of days worked in the fields on dummies for periods before and after the
harvest. The dashed lines cover 95 percent confidence intervals. A rice crop requires labor in the months leading to the harvest.
[Activities]it = [FE]i + βM [Mean]t + βV [V olatility]t (2.1)
+ βE[Expecting Harvest]it + βH [Had Harvest]it
+ βRM [Rice Farmer]i × [Mean]t + βRV [Rice Farmer]i × [V olatility]t
+ βEM [Expecting Harvest]it × [Mean]t + βEV [Expecting Harvest]it × [V olatility]t
+ βHM [Had Harvest]it × [Mean]t + βHV [Had Harvest]it × [V olatility]t + εit.
Aside from the responses of non-farmers and farmers who do not expact a harvest, I
must also control for the responses of farmers who just had a harvest. Having had a harvest
is negatively correlated with expecting a harvest and cannot be left in the error term. In
some regressions I replace the main effects [Mean] and [Volatility] with month dummies.
Month dummies eliminate much of the variation in volatility but produce more conservative
estimates. Since the volatility is generated I use a two-stage bootstrap for all inference in
the results I report in Section 2.5.1. The details of the bootstrap are in the Online Appendix
B.3.
The coefficient βEV on [ExpectingHarvest] × [V olatility] measures the average re-
sponse to volatility of a farmer who expects a harvest, while controlling for the responses of
non-farmers and farmers without upcoming harvests. Since the number of activities is my
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measure of specialization, βEV measures the causal effect of risk on under-specialization.
Test 1 predicts it should be positive. The coefficient βEM on [ExpectingHarvest] ×
[Mean] measures the response to higher average prices, and Test 2 predicts it should be
negative.
2.3.2 The Costs of Under-Specialization
Risk may drive households into extra side activities, but are they costly? It is hard to
imagine why else the household would diversify only when risk increases. If the extra
activities were costless the household ought to have as many as possible. Test 3, however,
suggests a direct approach: to check whether revenue from side activities falls as the farmer
adds more activities.
Rises in volatility will cause farmers expecting a harvest to increase their number of
activities, but by construction these farmers have not yet sold their harvest and collected
their primary revenue. I cannot run any test on total revenue. Test 3 solves the problem
by showing that if revenue from side activities falls when the household adds activities
then under-specialization is costly. Figure 2.6 shows that most rice farmers have many
activities—cassava fields or bakeries—even when volatility is average. Test 3 says that if
a rice farmer’s revenue from cassava falls when he baking bread, and the loss to cassava
outweighs the gain from bread, then extra activities are costly. I can confirm extra activities
are costly if I have instruments that drive farmers into more activities without directly
affecting revenue.
The response of farmers expecting a harvest to the mean and volatility of prices is
exactly the instrument I need. Since household revenue before the harvest does not include
revenue from rice, movements in the rice price cannot affect revenue directly. Greater
risk might cause a household to invest less in physical and human capital, but the effect
will not appear for years to come. My regressions measure very short run changes from
month-to-month. I can then run the following first-stage regression
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+ βE[Expecting Harvest]it + βH [Had Harvest]it
+ βRM [Rice Farmer]i × [Mean]t + βRV [Rice Farmer]i × [V olatility]t
+ βEM [Expecting Harvest]it × [Mean]t + βEV [Expecting Harvest]it × [V olatility]t
+ βHM [Had Harvest]it × [Mean]t + βHV [Had Harvest]it × [V olatility]t + εit.
The second-stage regression excludes [ExpectingHarvest]×[Mean] and [ExpectingHarvest]×
[V olatility] like so:




+ γE[Expecting Harvest]it + γH [Had Harvest]it
+ γRM [Rice Farmer]i × [Mean]t + γRV [Rice Farmer]i × [V olatility]t
+ γHM [Had Harvest]it × [Mean]t + γHV [Had Harvest]it × [V olatility]t + uit.
Test 3 predicts the coefficient on [Activities] γA should be negative. The final test, Test
4, predicts the coefficient on [Activities] κA in the simple OLS regression
[Revenue]it = κA[Activities]it +
∑
t
κD,m[Month Dummy]t + εit (2.4)
should be biased upward relative to the IV regression.
2.4 Data
I build my sample from the annual and monthly surveys of the Townsend Thai project. In
May, 1997 the project surveyed over two thousand rural households in four provinces. The
annual survey followed the households from one-third of the baseline districts up through
2010 (Townsend et al., 1997). The monthly survey followed the baseline households plus
several new additions from four of the remaining districts (Townsend, 2012). The monthly
survey reocrds changes in household income, crop conditions, and many other features of
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the household. To these features I add the monthly international price of rice from January
1980 to June 2012, taken from the IMF’s commodity price dataset.8
I use the monthly data to test the theory of risky income. My final sample contains
all 743 households that responded to at least two of the seventy-two monthly rounds the
project has released. Table 2.2 summarizes the sample characteristics. I observe the average
household for 65 months, but have the full five years of data for over three-quarters of
households. I mark a household to be a rice farmer if it harvests rice at any point in the
sample. I mark a household as expecting a harvest if it harvests rice in the next three
months; I mark it as having had a recent harvest if it harvested rice in the current month
or the previous three months.9 Table 2.2 shows that households expected a harvest one-
fifth of the time. I define the number of economic activities as the sum of the number of
“large” businesses, crop-plots cultivated, types of livestock raised, number of jobs held by
all members, number of miscellaneous or small businesses, and an indicator for whether
the household engages in aquaculture (raising fish or shrimp). I define total revenue as
the sum of revenue from each economic activity. I define total consumption as all weekly
and monthly household expenditure. Net transfers, which I use to classify households as
insured in Section 2.3.1, are the total incoming transfers minus total outgoing transfers. I
deflate revenue, consumption, and transfers to be in May 2007 Thai baht.10
Table 2.2 shows that the average monthly revenue is 620 U.S. dollars per month at May
2007 exchange rates. This figure is skewed upward because revenue is bounded below by
zero but spikes during rice harvests; hence the high standard deviation. Consumption is
less seasonal and the mean of 194 dollars is less skewed.
I test the theory of lumpy investments with the annual panel. In addition to the four
provinces and roughly 1000 households followed from baseline, the project added two
more provinces and roughly 500 more households several years into the survey (both from
the new provinces and from the original villages to counter attrition). My final annual sam-
ple for the lumpy investment tests is 1502 households. I construct the number of activities
as closely as possible to my monthly measure: the sum of the number of large businesses,
crop-plots, jobs, herds, an indicator for aquaculture, and a subset of the miscellaneous in-
come sources. 11 The annual average of 4.6 activities is almost identical to the monthly
8I treat a household-month surveyed in the first half of the month as though observed in the previous
month when I merge with time series data and define month dummies. Since the rice price and consumer
price index are monthly averages, my convention best matches the survey response period to the horizons of
the aggregate prices.
9Some fraction of households claim to sell rice during months when they still expect a harvest. In Ap-
pendix B.4 I show that dropping these observations does not change the results.
10For more details on how I construct the variables, see Appendix B.2.
11Miscellaneous income sources in the annual survey often include remittances and other sources that do
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Table 2.2
Descriptives of the Monthly Sample
Household-Month Mean Fraction of Households
and Standard Deviation or Household-Months
Number of activities: 4.6 Revenue: 21352.8 Rice Farmers: 0.48
(3.3) (79854.7)
Of Whom
Household size: 5.3 Consumption: 6692.2 Fraction of time
0.23
(2.4) (24449.2) expecting harvest:
Total Labor: 80.0 Net Transfers In: 667.0 Fraction of time
0.31
(75.6) (35274.8) just had harvest:
Households: 743 Avg. Obs/HH: 65.0 Observations: 48329
average in Table 2.2, but it varies less because the annual measure wipes out within-year
variation in activities.
The histogram in Figure 2.6, which shows the distribution of number of activities in an
arbitrary month, confirms that households in Thailand have many economic activities. Rice
farmers are particularly under-specialized. Figure 2.7 graphs the top seven spontaneous
responses to “What did your household do in the worst year [for income] of the last five
to get by?” The most popular response was to take on an extra occupation, followed by
working harder than usual. These responses do not prove households avoid risk through
under-specialization, only that they cope with shocks through under-specialization. But
if households must smooth their consumption by working harder, then they must have
no better option. Borrowing money is only the third most popular response and using
savings only the fifth. The fourth most popular response is to consume less, meaning many
households lack even second-rate insurance.
Figure 2.8 shows the correlation between revenue and consumption, which direct ev-
idence of imperfect insurance. I compute the correlation between monthly revenue and
consumption expenditure for each household over however many months I observe it (72
months for the majority). If a risk-averse household has perfect insurance, its consumption
should be independent of its current revenue; in fact, it should be constant. A household
without perfect insurance cuts consumption when revenue falls, making the correlation
positive. A higher correlation is evidence of less insurance. The figure plots the density
not meet my definition of economic activities (namely, revenue generating activities that require labor). I filter
these unwanted sources using regular expressions on the textual descriptions of sources. The 1999 survey
unfortunately does not contain textual descriptions, but the year dummies in the annual regressions should
account for any 1999-specific measurement error.
47
Figure 2.6
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Note: The histogram depicts fraction of households with any number of economic activities in an arbitrarily chosen month. Rice farmers
are more likely to have many activities.
of the correlation among rice farmers and non-rice farmers. Since zero is modal it appears
many households do have near-perfect insurance, but many more do not. The distribu-
tion is heavily skewed towards less insurance with rice farmers particularly uninsured.12
Some households have a negative correlation because of sampling error: the true correla-
tion might be zero, but my estimate fluctuates around the truth and lands below zero for
some households.
2.5 Risk and Under-Specialization Results
2.5.1 Main Results
Table 2.3 reports the results of the four tests derived in Section 2.2 and implemented as
described in Section 2.3. Column 1 and 2 estimate (2.1) first with and without month dum-
mies. Column 3 estimates (2.4), and Column 4 estimates (2.3). Aside from the ordinary
least squares regression reported in Column 3, all regressions use the generated measure
of volatility. I calculate the p-values and confidence intervals of these regressions using
a two-stage bootstrap. The bootstrap, which I describe in detail in the online appendix,
12The result may seem at odds with the high degree of insurance Townsend (1994) finds, but recall his
result is that household consumption moves only with village-level and not household-level income. Figure
2.8 does not control for village-level shocks because a household cares only about having stable consumption,
not where instability comes from. The shock I use for identification in Section 2.3 is a village-level shock:






































Note: The 1997 round of the Townsend Thai annual survey asks households how they coped during the the worst income year of the last
five. They first gave spontaneous responses, which the project classified into categories. The graph reports the frequencies of the seven
most popular responses. Many households work more or spend less to absorb income shocks rather than borrowing or using savings.
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Figure 2.8
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Note: I compute each household’s monthly correlation between total consumption and total revenue and plot the density of the correlation
for rice farmers and non-rice farmers. Perfect insurance (whether self-insurance or otherwise) implies zero correlation. Almost all
households have a positive correlation, meaning they absorb shocks to revenue by consuming less. The problem is worse for rice
farmers.
corrects for the generated volatility measure and within-household correlation in the error
term across time.13
The model’s first test—Test 1—states that greater risk causes entry into more activities.
The effect of risk on activities is the coefficient on [ExpectingHarvest] × [V olatility]
in Column 1 of Table 2.3, and as predicted it is positive and significant. The model also
predicts in Test 2 that higher expected returns to the primary activity (rice farming) should
cause a decrease in activities. The coefficient on [ExpectingHarvest]× [Mean] confirms
that higher returns have a negative and significant effect on number of activities. Column
2 verifies that both results hold when I include month fixed-effects, though the estimate of
the effect of risk on activities becomes smaller.
Test 3 states that if the extra activities rice farmers take on cause their (side) revenue
to fall, then the failure to specialize is costly. I implement the test by running using the
regression in Column 2 as a first-stage regression for (2.3) using the response of farmers
expecting a harvest to expected price and volatility as instruments for the number of activ-
ities. Column 4 of Table 2.3 reports the two-stage least squares coefficient on [Activities]
is negative and significant, confirming that under-specialization is costly. Column 3 reports
the results of the simple ordinary least squares regression with month dummies of revenue
13It is not clear how to bootstrap the F-statistic on the excluded instruments or the Hansen’s J Statistic.
However, I can simply replace the generated volatility with the |P2P1| in the first stage. Since this is per-
fectly collinear with the generated measure it produces algebraically identical coefficients, but since it is not




(1) (2) (3) (4)








- ×Mean 0.01*** 0.00 -128.97
[0.010] [0.359] [0.135]
- × Volatility -0.20*** -0.10*** -272.90
[0.002] [0.009] [0.618]
Expecting Harvest
- Main 1.82*** 1.89*** 4993.52
[0.006] [0.000] [0.310]
- ×Mean -0.02*** -0.02*** (Exc. Inst.)
[0.000] [0.000]
- × Volatility 0.18*** 0.05* (Exc. Inst.)
[0.001] [0.089]
Recent Harvest
- Main -0.76 -0.57 -34753.04**
[0.475] [0.303] [0.034]
- ×Mean -0.03*** -0.01*** 300.00
[0.000] [0.002] [0.129]
- × Volatility 0.41*** 0.17*** 234.48
[0.002] [0.004] [0.819]
Household Fixed-Effects Yes Yes No Yes
Month Fixed-Effects No Yes Yes Yes
F-Stat Exc. Inst. 13.604
Hansen’s J Stat. 0.125
Households 743 743 743 743
Observations 48329 48329 48329 48329
Note: The regressions the four tests of the theory of risky income (see Section 2.2): Test 1 (Risk): risk increases the number of activities;
Test 2 (Returns): higher returns decrease the number of activities; Test 3 (Cost): more activities may cause side revneue to fall; Test 4
(OLS Bias): OLS is biased upwards. Column 1 estimates Equation 2.1, Column 2 estimates Equation 2.2, Column 3 estimates Equation
2.4, and Column 4 estimates Equation 2.3. The bracketed values are p-values. I compute the p-values in Columns 1,2 and 4 using a
two-stage bootstrap that corrects for generated regressors and clusters at the household level (see Appendix B.3). I compute the p-values
in Column 3 using the usual asymptotic standard errors that cluster at the household level. The value of the F-statistic on the excluded
instruments from the first stage meets common standards for strength. The value of the J-statistic for overidentification is much too small
to reject the null of exogenous instruments.
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on number of activities (2.4). Test 4 states that the ordinary least squares coefficient on
[Activities] should be biased positively relative to the two-stage least squares coefficient
because the farmers who pay lower costs for additional activities are exactly those who
select into more activities. The coefficient is biased so strongly the sign flips, making
under-specialization appear efficient.
What do the sizes of these coefficients mean? Since the average price volatility for all
available months is 8.8, the regression in Column 1 implies a 10 percent rise in volatility
causes the farmer to enter .18/(1/8.8) ∗ 10/100 = .16 additional activities. A similar
calculation shows that the more conservative estimate in Column 2 implies a 10 percent
rise in volatility causes the farmer to enter .04 activities. Recall from Table 2.1, however,
that the international price of rice is not perfectly correlated with the actual price the farmer
receives. This may be because government price supports give the farmer some insurance.
Regardless of the cause, since the international price has a correlation coefficient of roughly
1/3, a one unit rise in the volatility of the international rice price predicts a 1/3 unit rise in
the volatility of the price the farmer receives. We can adjust the earlier numbers by dividing
by 1/3, yielding estimates of .48 and .13 for the baseline and conservative estimates. The
baseline estimate suggests the household enters an additional activity when the prices it
faces become 21 percent more volatile.
The two-stage least squares estimate implies a household will forego over 13 thousand
baht, or over 60 percent of its average monthly revenue, in any year. According to the model
in Section 2.2 this estimate is actually biased upward, suggesting the true cost is even higher
than implied. But recall that the average household has a little over four activities at once,
making an additional activity a very large increase. Further, if the cost of an activity varies
across households the estimate is not the average cost. If there is an upper bound on the
number of activities a household can juggle, then the households with fewer activities are
those most likely to respond to the instruments. These are also the households for whom
an extra activity is most costly. Then the estimate, which is the continuous equivalent of
the local average treatment effect, might be higher than the average cost of a side activity.
The responses of households who had a recent harvest bear some explanation. First,
the coefficient on [RecentHarvest] × [Mean] is negative. Since the expected price after
the harvest is correlated with the price received at harvest, the negative coefficient confirms
both Figure 2.7 and the results of Adhvaryu et al. (2013), both of which say that households
increase their number economic activities in response to bad income shocks. Finally, the
positive and significant coefficient on [RecentHarvest]× [V olatility] seems puzzling, as
risk should not matter after a household has had its harvest. There are two explanations for
this. First, since the current volatility is correlated with past volatility, this may just reflect
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that the household faced risk before the harvest and took on extra activities. Since the
household cannot drop the extra activities immediately after harvest—temporary jobs must
be finished and small businesses must be wound down—the household may still have more
activities than usual after harvest. The second possibility is that since current volatility
simply says the price has moved drastically in the recent past. Since the expected price
([Mean]) does not perfectly capture the price at harvest, a high volatility means it is more
likely the household had a low price at harvest. Since households take on activities to
recover from low prices, the coefficient on post-harvest volatility may be picking up the
response to negative income shocks.
2.5.2 Robustness
Table 2.4 reports several robustness checks. The theory in Section 2.2 assumes the total
labor supplied by the household is fixed, but in truth the household may work less when the
returns to its labor grow riskier. Alternatively, the household might send some members
to work abroad or in Bangkok. Columns 1 and 2 show that the effects of higher volatility
and higher returns on the number of activities remain unchanged when I control for the
household’s total labor and the number of household members. Likewise, Column 6 shows
that the effect of additional activities on revenue remains unchanged.
Columns 3 and 7 of Table 2.4 both answer a simple concern: should we believe Thai
rice farmers use a model of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity to decide how to
spend their time? The model only formalizes a simple intuition: when prices fluctuate they
are risky. Columns 3 and 7 confirm that simpler measures of the mean and volatility—the
current price and the absolute value of the change in the price since last month—do not
much change the results.
If the volatility of the price is just a proxy for unexpected decreases in the price, then
what I assume is a response to risk may in truth be a response to changes in the household’s
permanent income. If this story is true, then the household should respond more strongly
to simple changes in the price than to my measure of volatility, which is proportional to
the absolute value of the change. Column 4 of Table 2.4 runs a regression that replaces my
measure of volatility with the simple change in price. Households expecting a harvest do
not respond to simple changes in the price.
The reader may also worry whether the expected price and the volatility are valid in-
struments for side revenue. If the price of rice and the price of corn, say, are correlated
then the expected price is no longer a valid instrument for rice farmers who also grow corn.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Transfers Rise when the Int'l Rice Price Is Low at Harvest
Note: The first bar depicts average incoming transfers for households harvesting rice when the international rice price is “normal”—
above the bottom quartile of all prices I observe in the period covered by the monthly panel. The second bar depicts the average transfers
when prices are “low”—in the bottom quartile. Rice farmers receive more money when the value of their harvest is low.
of revenue that excludes earnings from crops. In Appendix B.4 I show that median wages
in each village are not affected by average movements in the regressor of interest.
The final question is whether what I measure is really a response to risk. To test this I
examine whether households with better insurance respond less to changes in the volatility.
In poor countries a household often relies on family and friends for support in hard times.
14 Figure 2.9 shows the rice farmers in my sample are no different: when the international
price is low rice farmers tend to receive more transfers. I calculate for each household the
monthly correlation between its net incoming transfers and its revenue, and call a household
“insured” if that correlation is negative.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.5 report the separate responses of the uninsured and insured
sample. As expected, the response of the insured is smaller and insignificant. Since my
measure of insurance is not exogenous I cannot rule out that households with insurance
differ from uninsured households in ways that change how they might respond to volatility.
Still, though not a perfect test of the model the result is consistent with the model.
14Rosenzweig (1988) found that households structure themselves to ease income sharing. Townsend (1994)
and more recently Munshi and Rosenzweig (2009) find village and caste networks provide insurance in
India. Yang and Choi (2007) show that rural Filipino households who suffer bad rainfall shocks receive more








- ×Mean 0.01** -0.00
[0.027] [0.922]
- × Volatility -0.09* -0.10**
[0.069] [0.013]
Expecting Harvest
- Main 1.65*** 1.99***
[0.001] [0.000]
- ×Mean -0.02*** -0.02***
[0.000] [0.000]
- × Volatility 0.09* 0.04
[0.067] [0.277]
Recent Harvest
- Main -0.77 -0.39
[0.186] [0.557]
- ×Mean -0.01 -0.01***
[0.221] [0.006]
- × Volatility 0.14** 0.19***
[0.025] [0.003]
Household Fixed-Effects Yes Yes
Month Fixed-Effects Yes Yes
Households 270 473
Observations 16933 31396
Note: I split the sample into households who receive transfers of income when their consumption is low (“insured”) and those that do
not (“uninsured”). I confirm that volatility has a larger effect on the number of activities among households that are uninsured.
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2.6 The Alternative Theory: Lumpy Investments
If “the poor cannot raise the capital they would need to run a business that would occupy
them fully” (Banerjee and Duflo, 2007) then poor households cannot specialize. Suppose a
man can learn to sew or bake but cannot can sew more than a few shirts or bake more than a
few loaves without a sewing machine or an oven. Since he cannot afford either investment
he cannot grow either business and cannot support his family unless he sells both shirts and
bread. This is the theory of lumpy investments.15
To test the theory I exploit a government program that produced quasi-experimental
variation in the supply of credit. The theory predicts that households that get more credit
should be better able to make the lumpy investments that let them specialize. The Million
Baht Program gave one million baht to a fund for public lending in every village in my
sample. Kaboski and Townsend (2009, 2011), who are the first to exploit the program,
argue that the boundaries of villages in Thailand are set by bureaucratic fiat rather than
economic logic. The sizes of villages are effectively random. Since every village got the
same amount of credit the per-household increase in credit is also random, with smaller
villages exogenously given more credit. Kaboski and Townsend (2011) confirm in their
first table that small and large villages have parallel trends.
Since I do not know when in 2001 the program reached each village, I use the annual
data and treat 2001 as the year of implementation. The effect of the program is measured
by the interaction of the year of implementation interacted with some measure of village
size. In one specification I use an indicator for whether the household is in the bottom
quartile in number of households; in the other I use the actual per-household injection
(1 million/number of households).16 The theory predicts that the signs of the coefficients
should be negative and significant.
According to Table 2.6 the coefficients are insignificant and have the wrong sign. The
positive coefficients on 2001 × Small and the other interactions are not consistent with
the lumpy investment theory, but might be consistent with the model from Section 2.2. If
risk is really what drives under-specialization and some households want more activities
but cannot afford to pay the fixed-cost, giving them credit might let them enter more ac-
15The inability to invest may create another source of under-specialization: the need to take on extra jobs
because one may only work so long at any single task. Suppose labor and capital are complements, and make
it simple with an extreme example: perfect complementarity. Suppose an activity m produces revenue with
production function ym = Am min[L,K], with m = T,B for tailoring or baking. Suppose AT > AB for
some household. If the household’s labor endowment is L̄, it will specialize in tailoring with K∗ = L̄. But
suppose increasing capital beyond K̃ < K∗ requires a lumpy investment the household cannot afford. If the
household specialized, it would be left with L̄ − K̃ units of unused labor. In other words, it would be idle.
The alternative is to spend its remaining time baking, so its total revenue is AT K̃ +AB(L̄− K̃) < AT L̄.
16The results do not change when I use the log of the injection as in Shenoy (2014a).
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Table 2.6
Testing the Theory of Lumpy Investments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Activities Activities Activities Activities
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Small Village -0.010 0.102
(0.11) (0.11)
2001 X Small 0.132 0.175
(0.16) (0.16)




2001 X Credit/HH 11.540 11.569
(8.63) (8.20)
2002 X Credit/HH 21.857∗ 16.619
(11.55) (11.86)
Household Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month Fixed-Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Villages 80 80 64 64
Households 1502 1502 706 706
Observations 15340 15340 9884 9884
All standard errors clustered by village
Note: The regressions test the lumpy investment theory using the Million Baht Program. The coefficient on the interaction of village
size with the year of implementation (2001) estimates the effect of relaxed credit on number of activities. The measure of number of
activities is similar as possible to that in the risk regressions. A village in the bottom quartile of number of households is “small”. The
alternative specification uses the average per-household credit injection (one million divided by number of households). The first two
columns use the largest possible sample of households while the last two use a balanced panel. The lumpy investment theory predicts
the program’s impact should be negative and significant, which it is not. All inference uses the usual asymptotic standard errors that
cluster at the village-level.
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tivities. But this story, which lacks direct evidence and rests on coefficients that are not
signficant, remains only a story. Only the coefficient on 2002× Credit/HH in Column 2
is (marginally) significant, and even that significance vanishes when I restrict the estimation
in Column 4 to a balanced panel.
My results do not mean credit constraints have no effect on specialization. Aside from
the usual caveats—a lack of evidence is not a rejection, and rejection in Thailand does not
mean rejection in other countries—I only test a limited form of the theory. The smallest
villages received per-household credit injections of half the median income. If households
need sewing machines and ovens the credit injection would cover it. Since most micro
credit charities believe small entrepreurs need small loans, finding no effect from a small
rise in the supply of credit is not trivial. But if a few households want to build factories that
would provide stable and salaried jobs to everyone else, the Million Baht Program is too
small.
2.7 Summary
I show that Thai rice farmers expecting a harvest increase their number of economic activ-
ities when confronted with more volatile prices. My estimates suggest a 21 percent rise in
volatility causes a household to enter an extra activity. I use this exogenous change in the
number of activities to verify under-specialization reduces revenue. Finally, I test an al-
ternative theory of under-specialization—that the poor run many small businesses because
they cannot afford the lumpy investments needed to grow any one—and find no supporting
evidence.
The pin-maker wastes time when he switches from straightening wires to cutting them,
and I find evidence of this waste in rural Thailand. My results do not measure the talent and
investment wasted when the poor forego expertise in a single trade or investment in a single
business. This kind of under-specialization, which changes the structure of an economy, is
a long-run cost that requires a long-run study. Future research must test whether long-run
risk causes long-run under-specialization and how much it costs.
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CHAPTER 3
Does Factionalism Distort Production? The Case
of Caste Politics in Rural India
3.1 Introduction
It is sometimes deemed acceptable for governments to discriminate. They charge higher
taxes to the rich, give cheap loans to students, and give subsidies to farmers without (much)
outcry. But when governments discriminate for political rather than economic reasons they
are accused of factionalism. Favoring the supporters of those in power is a mark of misgov-
ernance. Using the term “extractive institutions,” Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) blame
such misgovernance for many countries’ underdevelopment. By distorting production fac-
tionalism keeps poor countries poor. Or at least that is the prevailing belief.
This paper shows that the prevailing belief is not always true. I build a model in which
firms are aligned either with or against the faction in government. Firms can increase their
productivity if they get a government service. The bureaucrat who provides the service
can demand a bribe, and he is less likely to be caught if he demands bribes from firms in
the losing faction. He responds by charging fewer bribes to winners; this is factionalism.
But the bureaucrat sets his bribe like a monopolist sets a nonlinear price; he maximizes
economic surplus and then extracts it all. Since the bribe must not distort the firm’s behavior
it must not depend on the firm’s choice of inputs. It depends only on faction. Ironically
the very fact that the bureaucrat discriminates for political rather than economic reasons
prevents any distortion.
I test the model by studying how the outcome of a village council election affects Indian
farmers. In India the services of both the national and local government flow through local
bureaucrats. A bureaucrat who grants ration cards or land titles has a chance to extract
bribes. Since the village council and its president can fire the bureaucrat he risks his job
if he demands bribes of the president’s faction. Factions in an Indian village are typically
based on caste. Since each farmer’s caste is known the bureaucrat can tell which are aligned
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with the president. A clear test for factionalism is to check whether being of the same caste
as the council president causes a household to pay fewer bribes.
I implement the test using a regression discontinuity design. I define the vote differ-
ence of each candidate as the difference between her share of the vote and the share of
whichever other candidate got the most votes. For each farmer I define the running vari-
able as the vote difference of the candidate with the same caste. When this vote difference
switches from negative to positive the household’s alignment switches from the loser to the
winner. Households just above and below the threshold are otherwise identical. By check-
ing whether the probability the household pays a bribe changes at the discontinuity I test for
factionalism. By next checking whether farm output changes I test whether factionalism
distorts production.
I combine data on bribes, farm production, and election outcomes from a panel of
rural Indian households. For each administration of the village council, households report
which officials they approached for government services and of these which demanded a
bribe. Households also report their farm production in one year of the same administration.
Finally, households report their caste and subcaste. Using these reports I link households
to candidates who contested the election that determined each administration.
Figures 3.1 summarizes my results. I look at two outcomes: a dummy for whether the
household paid any bribes, and the log of the value of farm output. I regress each on a
cubic polynomial in the running variable (with coefficients that may differ on either side
of the discontinuity), and an indicator for whether the household’s candidate won. Panel A
of Figure 3.1 shows that in approaching the discontinuity the probability of having to bribe
an official rises among losers and falls among winners. After a close election bureaucrats
are far less likely to demand bribes from households of the same caste as the winner. But
according to Panel B of Figure 3.1 this evidence of factionalism does not come with any
evidence of a distortion to production. The log of the value of farm output falls near the
discontinuity for both winners and losers. I run the same test on measures of input use—
land sown, fertilizer used, pesticides bought—and find no evidence that farmers in the
losing faction use less. As the model predicts, I find no evidence to suggest factionalism
distorts whether a farmer seeks government services. Losing households borrow no less
money and pay no more interest.
This paper adds to three areas of literature. The first explores the causes and costs
of corruption. Banerjee (1997) creates a model where bribery and red tape arise from a
conflict of interest between a benevolent government and the self-interested bureaucrats
who implement its policies. Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) build a model with a similar
conflict of interest to show that the ultimate cause of a failure of governance may be a
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Figure 3.1
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Note: The panels plot the predicted values of the incidence of bribery and the log of the value of farm output based on a cubic polynomial
in the vote difference. The coefficients of the polynomial can vary on either side of zero. The dots are the average bribe paid within a
±0.5 percentage point bin. Each bin may contain a different number of households and elections.
failure of markets. Like Banerjee’s model mine predicts an efficient allocation despite
corruption, but the reason is different. His model assumes the benevolent government can
detect misallocation and punish bureaucrats for it. My model assumes the government is
actually hostile to some firms. Yet bureaucrats still want the efficient outcome because it
maximizes their profits. This alignment of incentives also explains why the prediction of
my model differs from that of Acemoglu and Verdier. In both models the bureaucrat sells
each firm the outcome it wants, but the market failure in their model makes each firm want
an inefficient outcome.
Another literature studies how ethnic conflict distorts a government’s ability to provide
ethnic goods. Miguel and Gugerty (2005) show that ethnically diverse villages in Kenya
provide fewer public goods, leaving everyone worse off. Figure 3.1.B is consistent with
their result; the output of winners and losers alike falls after the more polarized electons
near the discontinuity. But Miguel and Gugerty do not study whether winners and losers
are treated differently. Besley et al. (2004) comes closest to my question and context. They
show that low caste Indian households are more likely to receive government benefits in
villages reserved for low caste candidates. But villages may not be randomly chosen for
reservation in the states they study. It is not clear whether the effect they find is causal. My
study can identify the causal effect of having a president of the same caste. Moreover, I
study the effect on production rather than the distribution of government benefits.1
1The government services that matter most to farmers are non-rival whereas ration cards and other such
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My paper links these two literatures to a third that studies the misallocation of produc-
tive resources. Banerjee and Munshi (2004) show that ethnic divisions cause misallocation
in the garment district of Thirapur, but do not study political power. Fisman (2001) shows
that having ties to Suharto’s regime affects the prices of stocks in Indonesian firms, but
cannot measure the direct effect on production. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) show that state
owned enterprises in China are allocated too much capital, but cannot claim the pattern is
causal. Finally, I show in earlier work (Shenoy, 2014a) that factor and financial market
failures among Thai rice farmers cause surprisingly little misallocation. Unlike my earlier
work, this paper isolates one cause of market failures: factionalism. The results suggest the
link from factionalism to misallocation is subtle. Even severe factionalism need not cause
any misallocation.
3.2 Theory
Suppose each firm chooses a vector of inputs X and produces revenue using a production
function Aif(X;G). Ai is the firm’s productivity and G ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator for
whether the firm has access to a government service. For clarity I assume the service is
binary, but the result is unchanged if G is continuious.






meaning the service increases the return to every input. The service might directly raise
productivity, as irrigation or electrification would, or it might grant access to the credit the





For each firm i the optimal choice of inputs X∗i (·) and optimal level of output y∗i (·)
depends on whether the firm has the government service:
X∗i (Ai;G = 1) >X
∗
i (Ai;G = 0)
y∗i (Ai;G = 1) > y
∗
i (Ai;G = 0)
benefits can only go to so many households. Even assuming Besley et al. do find a causal effect this difference
in the services they study would create a difference in the effect of factionalism.
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Then the benefit of the service to firm i is
bi = y
∗
i (G = 1)− y∗i (G = 0)
The bureaucrat who provides the service earns a wage w, which he may supplement
by demanding a bribe. The firm could respond to his demand by complaining to higher
authorities. Only some firms have this option; for example, those with managers who are
friends with a powerful politician. The firm is more likely to have friends in high places
if it is a member of the faction in power—that is, if the firm’s faction F = W for winner
rather than F = L for loser. Let pF be the probability a firm of faction F can complain.
Then
pW > pL.
When a firm complains the bureaucrat is fired. He must return the bribe and loses his
wage w. Given this risk the bureaucrat must decide whether to demand a bribe and if so
how large the bribe should be.
Suppose the bureaucrat has decided to demand a bribe. He sets the size of the bribe
using a function B(Ai,Xi, Fi). The B(·) that maximizes the bureaucrat’s bribe is the
same as the policy that maximizes a monopolist’s profit: a nonlinear price. The bureaucrat
maximizes economic surplus then sets a bribe that extracts it all:
B∗(Ai,Xi, Fi) = bi
The firm is left indifferent between taking and not taking the government service. By
letting the bureaucrat set this bribe I have assumed he knows firm i’s productivity Ai.
Now consider the bureaucrat’s decision of whether to demand a bribe. He will demand
a bribe if the expected benefit of getting away with it exceeds the certain benefit of asking
no bribe and drawing the wage:





= f [X∗(GF = 1);GF = 1]− f [X∗(GF = 0);GF = 0]
Suppose Ai has a distribution function H . Since factions are purely political H is the
same for both the winning and losing faction. That is, H(Ai | F = W ) = H(Ai | F =
L) = H(Ai). This assumption holds in my empirical work because I use a regression
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discontinuity to ensure the winning and losing faction are otherwise identical.
Rearrange (3.1) and apply the distribution function. The probability the bureaucrat asks










Clearly PW < PL; the bureaucrat is less likely to demand bribes of a firm in the winning
faction. But the size of the bribe is chosen not to distort the firm’s actions. It follows that
all firms, whether winners or losers, will get the same number of services, choose the same
level of inputs, and produce the same level of output:
E[Gi | F = W ] = E[Gi | F = L]
E[X∗i | F = W ] = E[X∗i | F = L]
E[y∗i | F = W ] = E[y∗i | F = L]
3.3 Bribes and Factions in Rural India
The bureaucracy stands between India’s public and its public goods. Land records, ration
cards, guaranteed employment, and even a connection to the power grid come only with
the signature of a bureaucrat, and his signature often comes only with a bribe. Corruption
in India has inspired protests, legislation, and even Bollywood movies. All have failed to
end it.
Using data from my sample, Figures 3.2 and 3.3 summarize which officials and services
command the most bribes. Households were asked to reflect on the most recent administra-
tion of the village government. Each household reported which bureaucrats it approached
for government services, which of these bureaucrats asked for bribes, and how big was each
bribe.
Figure 3.2 shows the ten most corrupt bureaucrats based on what fraction of all bribes
they accounted for. Together these ten account for over 70 percent of the incidence and
over half of the value of all bribes. The Lekhpal, or land secretary, illustrates the power of
the bureaucracy over the public. Since he issues the Record of Rights—the title to a piece
of land—no one can prove they own their land without his help. Without such proof a bank
will not accept land as collateral. Given the land secretary’s importance it is not surprising
most households who asked his help had to pay a bribe. The other prodigious bribe-takers
are similar; they stand between households and an important government service. Figure
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3.3 reports the ten services that account for most bribes. Getting the Record of Rights
tops the list, but all these services unlock a government benefit or verify a household’s
condition.2
These bureaucrats answer to the Gram Panchayat, a council of locally elected repre-
sentatives. The council is led by a president, the Pradhan, who in most states is chosen
every five years by direct election. Though their exact powers vary by state, in all cases the
president and council manage the local bureaucracy. In Karnataka the ”Gram Panchayat
may reduce in rank, remove or dismiss any employee,” and the president has veto power
over the hiring and wages of each bureaucrat (Govt. of Karnataka, 1993).
In some cases the president may explicitly tell bureaucrats to help friends and hurt foes,
as in the village of Meerapur:
Thirdly, Gaj Pal [the new council president] developed his nexus with the func-
tionaries of the village including the Lekhpal. . . and sought their favours to ex-
tend support to some and withdraw the same from many (Sharma, 1988, p.
63).
But even without instruction the bureaucrat knows it unwise to demand bribes of the
president’s supporters. Though the bureaucrat may not know each villager’s faction, in a
small village he does know each villager’s caste. As I show in Section 3.4, caste and faction
are often the same.
3.4 Empirical Approach
Simply comparing how many bribes are paid by farmers aligned with the president to farm-
ers aligned with her opponent is a flawed test of factionalism. The winners and losers of an
election differ for reasons other than faction. Regardless of faction, bureaucrats will treat
them differently. For example, suppose every election pits a rich faction against a poor
faction. If there are more poor people than rich people the members of the losing faction
will on average be richer. A bureaucrat who charges rich people more bribes will seem to
favor winners over losers even if he cares nothing for faction. What looks like factionalism
will in truth be only selection bias.
I handle selection bias by exploiting the regression discontinuity created by a close
election. Let C be the set of candidates competing in a first-past-the-post election. Suppose
Candidate A’s share of the vote is sA. Define her vote difference as
2Tables C.1 and C.2 in Appendix C.1 show the numbers used to construct these graphs. I compute these
numbers from the reports of households in my sample (see Section 3.5). The data cover the period since the








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fraction of All Bribes 
68
Figure 3.4


















Candidates' Reports of the Source of Political Support
Caste Religion
Wealthy Person Political Party
[V ote Difference] = sA − max
c∈C\{A}
{sc},
the difference between her share of the vote and the share of the highest vote-getter
excluding her. For the winner of the election the difference is the gap between her share
and the share of the runner-up; for every other candidate it is the (negative) gap between
their share and the share of the winner. The difference switches from negative to positive
when a candidate switches from losing to winning the election.
Before I can find the effect of being in the losing faction I must first assign each fac-
tion a candidate and each farmer a faction. The survey from which I draw my household
sample also collected data on each candidate who ran for the council presidency. For each
candidate the survey asks whether the candidate relied on any of several sources of po-
litical support. Figure 3.4 compares what fraction of candidates relied on caste, religion,
a wealthy person, or a political party. Caste is by far the most important; it is a natural
basis for a faction. I assign to each farmer the vote difference of the candidate of the same
sub-caste (uppajati). When the farmer’s vote difference switches from negative to positive
he switches from being in the losing faction to being in the winning faction. Farmers just
above and just below the discontinuity should be similar in every dimension except that
those above are in the winning faction. By comparing the bribes paid on either side of the
discontinuity I can identify the causal effect of being in power on bribes paid.
My research design fails if farmers can manipulate their vote share. An individual
household can only make such manipulations by changing its caste, which is impossible.
But a caste group might manipulate a close election by consistently picking a better can-
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didate or consistently rigging the outcome. Households of such a caste would differ from
other households for reasons other than the election. I test for such differences by checking
whether pre-determined outcomes—religion and caste, or wealth held before any election
in my sample—change at the discontinuity. As I show in Section 3.6, there are no such
changes.
Since nothing changes at the discontinuity except who wins the election, I can control
for all other factors with a polynomial in the vote difference. As bribery may be a compli-
cated function of the vote difference, I follow the literature by restricting my sample to a
window around zero. The restriction reduces the number of twists and turns the polynomial
must fit. I estimate a cubic polynomial within the window of vote differences between -10
and 10, and verify the main results do not change when I tweak the window and the degree
of the polynomial. In all specifications I let the coefficients of the polynomial differ on
either side of zero. I estimate a polynomial in a wider window around the discontinuity
instead of estimating lines in a very narrow window as Imbens and Lemieux (2008) pro-
pose. The linear method is simpler but I lose elections (and thus clusters) too quickly as
the window shrinks.
Let x̃ be the vote difference. I estimate
[Bribery] = β0[Constant] + α[Past Post] + β1x̃+ β2x̃
2 + β3x̃
3
+ [Past Post]× (β′1x̃+ β′2x̃2 + β′3x̃3) + ε (3.2)
where [Bribery] is some report of bribery and the indicator [Past Post] switches on
if the farmer’s candidate won. Since the vote difference varies only between elections I
cluster the standard errors by election. The coefficient on [Past Post] measures how many
fewer bribes a household must pay when its candidate wins.
After I establish the presence of factionalism I estimate
[Outcome] = γ0[Constant] + τ [Past Post] + γ1x̃+ γ2x̃
2 + γ3x̃
3
+ [Past Post]× (γ′1x̃+ γ′2x̃2 + γ′3x̃3) + ε (3.3)
where [Outcome] is access to a government service, the use of a farm input, or the




I construct my sample from the 2006 round of the Rural Economic Development Survey
(REDS). These data were collected by India’s National Council of Applied Economic Re-
search in collaboration with several U.S. researchers. The first round of the survey was in
1969; later rounds in 1970, 1971, 1982, 1999, and 2006 resurveyed as many of the original
households as possible.
The household module asked Indian villagers their caste and sub-caste, which are con-
verted into a caste code. The village module records each candidate for the position of
council president (Pradhan) and the number of votes she received. I discard tied elections,
then for the remaining elections calculate for each candidate the share of the vote she re-
ceived and the vote difference.
The survey does not record the castes of candidates but does record their names. In
most Indian states a person’s last name is simply his caste in the local language. For each
village I build a crosswalk between caste and name by assigning to each last name the
caste most frequently associated with it. 3 Since Indian names are often transliterated
many different ways I use the user-written Stata command reclink to make a fuzzy match
on last names between my crosswalk and the candidates. I discard any match made with
less than 90 percent certainty. For each election I link households to the vote difference of
the candidate with the same caste code; if a caste has more than one candidate I use the
candidate who received the most votes. I drop households who cannot be linked to any
candidate.
The survey also asked each household which village officials it approached for services,
and of those which it had to bribe. I define an indicator for whether the household had to
bribe of these, dropping households who did not approach any officials. I also calculate
what fraction of officials each household bribed; if the household approached only the
land secretary and the development officer, and had to bribe the land secretary, I code
it as having bribed half of the officials approached. The survey asked households about
the current council period and the previous two. By linking the bribes paid in a council
period to the election preceding it I can examine the bribes paid as a function of the vote
difference of the household’s caste. The survey also asks which services the household
sought from the government (see Figure 3.3 for examples), which I use to construct total
services sought. I restrict my sample to households who cultivate land because my next
step is to test whether factionalism distorts farm production.
The 2006 survey records the value of crops produced, (gross) land cultivated, and




Fraction Bribed 0.11 Scheduled Caste/Tribe 0.07
(0.20) (0.25)
Gave Bribe 0.36 Muslim 0.03
(0.48) (0.16)
Vote Difference 2.88 Average Interest on Loans 6.04
(22.90) (11.92)
Past Post 0.65 Got Loan from Government 0.09
(0.48) (0.28)
Income, 1982 (Rs.) 3058.09 Value of Crops (Rs.) 3152.25
(2463.01) (4840.73)
Land, 1982 (Hect.) 3.99 Value of Chemical Fetilizer (Rs.) 239.90
(3.85) (398.67)
Full Sample −10 < V ote Difference < 10
-Observations 10017 -Observations 1054
-Elections 264 -Elections 88
−5 < V ote Difference < 5
-Observations 420
-Elections 37
Note: I calculate the means and standard deviations for the largest possible sample. Past Post is an indicator for whether the vote
difference is positive, meaning the candidate of the household’s caste won the election. Fraction Bribed is the fraction of officials
approached for services that the household had to bribe. The value of output, the value of expenditure, and income are all deflated to
1960 rupees.
spending on chemical fertilizer, pesticides, and irrigation. But these numbers measure
production only in the most recent election. To expand the sample I merge data on pro-
duction, recorded in an earlier round of the same survey, from 1999. Using the dates of
each election in each village I match the earlier data to the administration after either the
previous or the previous-to-previous election. After merging I have data on production for
566 observations from 54 elections.
The 2006 survey also records each loan the household requested over the last few
decades. For each household and each council period I compute the amount borrowed,
the average interest rate weighted by loan size (conditional on borrowing anything), and
whether the household received a loan from the government. I mark a loan as from the
government if it came from a cooperative society, a nationalized bank, a rural development
bank, a government scheme, or the Kisan credit program.
To test whether pre-determined variables change at the discontinuity I merge data on
income, wealth, savings, land, the size of the household, and the age of the household
head from 1982. I have data from 1982 for 738 observations from 82 elections. To the






Gave Bribe Fraction Bribed Bribe for Ration Card Bribe for Rec. of Rights
Estimate -0.937*** -0.381*** -0.312* -0.442***
(0.336) (0.146) (0.167) (0.120)
Observations 1054 1054 1054 1054
Elections 88 88 88 88
B. 1982 Sample
Gave Bribe Fraction Bribed Bribe for Ration Card Bribe for Rec. of Rights
Estimate -0.979** -0.423** -0.355** -0.282*
(0.387) (0.171) (0.174) (0.147)
Observations 738 738 738 738
Elections 82 82 82 82
Note: This table reports the results of the regression discontinuity design. The first two columns show that households of the caste that
won the election are less likely to pay any bribes and bribe a smaller fraction of the officials they approach for government services. The
third and fourth columns, which explore the reason for the bribe, show that winners are less likely to pay a bribe to get a ration card and
the record for rights for their land. Panel A shows the results for the entire sample. Panel B demonstrates that the results hold when I
restrict the sample to households used for the manipulation tests in Table 3.4—that is, households for which I have data from 1982. Each
observation is a household-election, and all standard errors are clustered at the election.
Table 3.1 give descriptive statistics for several of the variables, each calculated over
the largest possible sample. For most of the empirical work I use only elections within ten
percentage points of the discontinuity, and for a test of robustness I use elections within five
percentage points. The value of crops, shown in 1960 Indian Rupees, converts at current
exchange rates to 2157 U.S. dollars.
Many jaded Indians believe all officials are corrupt, but the survey suggests otherwise.
For the average household only 11 percent of the officials approached between elections
had to be bribed, and only 36 percent of households had to pay a bribe. But the chance of
having to pay a bribe is not fixed across all households or all elections. Recall Panel A of
Figure 3.1, which shows the probability of having to pay a bribe as a function of the vote
difference. The figure shows that losing households are far more likely to pay bribes after
close elections.
3.6 Results
Table 3.2 reports the results of using Equation 3.2 to estimate the effect of being in the
winning faction on several measures of bribery. The first column of Panel A, which looks
at the probability of having to pay any bribes, estimates the size of the gap shown in Figure
3.1. The estimate suggests that the winners of a close election never pay bribes while the




Polynomial Order −10 < V oteDifference < 10 −5 < V oteDifference < 5
Order 2 -1.385***
(0.351)








Note: I test whether the results are sensitive to how I estimate the regression discontinuity. Each cell reports a different specification’s
estimate of the effect of being in the winning faction on the probability of having to pay a bribe. Each row varies the order of the
polynomial control function and each column the window around the discontinuity.
percentage points fewer of the officials they approach for services. The last two columns
look at the probability of paying a bribe for specific services. Winners are 31 and 44
percentage points less likely to pay bribes for ration cards and the Record of Rights to their
land.
Why are these estimates so big? My main measure of factionalism, the change in the
probability of having to pay any bribes, is as large as it can be. Figure 3.1 suggests that close
elections differ from other elections. Away from the discontinuity bureaucrats prey on all
factions equally, but near the discontinuity factionalism grows worse. It is beyond the scope
of this paper to explore why close elections worsen factionalism. What matters here is that
if factionalism distorts production the biggest distortions should be at the discontinuity.
To confirm the results are robust Table 3.3 checks that that the probability of having
to pay a bribe remains consistent when I change two parts of the specification. The rows
vary the degree of the polynomial used in the control function while the columns vary
the window around the discontinuity. Since few elections lie within the smaller window I
control for bias there with polynomials of lower order. All of these estimates lie within two
standard errors of 1.
Table 3.4 verifies that households barely on either side of the discontinuity do not differ
as they would if the rich rigged the election or predicted its outcome. I check whether
several pre-determined outcomes jump at the discontinuity. I find no statistically significant
change in any of my measures of wealth and success in 1982 or in fixed factors like caste
and religion. These tests discard households for whom I have no data from 1982. Could the
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Table 3.4
Manipulation Tests: Pre-Determined Variables
Log Income (1982) Log Wealth (1982) Log Savings (1982) Land (1982) Age of Head (1982)
Estimate 0.704 0.522 0.900 3.538 -4.811
(0.611) (0.871) (1.170) (3.140) (13.379)
Observations 738 738 712 738 738
Elections 82 82 80 82 82
HH Size (1982) Scheduled Caste (2006) High Caste (2006) Hindu (2006) Muslim (2006)
Estimate -1.291 -0.005 -0.277 -0.196 0.110
(2.883) (0.111) (0.809) (0.135) (0.070)
Observations 738 1054 1054 1054 1054
Elections 82 88 88 88 88
Note: I test whether the outcome of a close election is truly random. Each cell gives the estimate of how some feature of the household
changes at the discontinuity. All these features were either recorded in the 1982 round of the survey or unlikely to change after birth (the
year the value was recorded is given in parentheses). Households just above the discontinuity do not seem to differ from houesholds just
below it.
Table 3.5
Placebo Tests: Fake Discontinuities
(1) (2)
Discontinuity at -5 Discontinuity at 5




Note: I estimate the effect of “winning” the election under the (false) assumption that a farmer’s candidate wins the election with a vote
difference of -5 and 5. The estimated effects at these fake discontinuities are insignificant.
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Figure 3.5
P-value on Tests for Whether Output Changes at the Discontinuity
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Factionalism Does Not Distort Production
Note: I estimate the regression discontinuity (Equation 3.3) to see if winners produce more output or seek more government services. I
test whether each measure changes at the discontinuity—whether the coefficient on [PastPost] is significant—and graph the p-values.
The top cluster uses the full sample with 1054 observations and 88 elections. The one exception is the test on average interest, which
uses the subset of households that borrowed any money (486 observations and 70 elections). The bottom cluster uses the sample of
observations for which I have data on production from 1999 or 2006. This sample contains 566 observations and 54 elections. In both
samples I can reject that the probability of paying a bribe does not change but cannot reject that any measure of government services or
production does not change.
failure to reject be driven by lost precision? Panel B of Table 3.4 shows that the answer is
no; even in the reduced sample I find evidence of factionalism. Table 3.5 tests whether the
probability of paying a bribe jumps at two fake discontinuities. As expected neither fake
discontinuity causes a statistically significant change.
The important test, however, is whether factionalism distorts production. The theory
predicts that neither the take-up of services nor the output of production should change
at the discontinuity. The prediction is consistent with Figure 3.5, which shows for each
outcome the p-value on the test of a change. The first cluster of results confirms that the
probability of paying a bribe does change. But the number of government services sought,
the total amount borrowed from all sources, the average interest rate conditional on bor-
rowing, and the probability of getting a loan from a government source do not change. The
second cluster of results looks at the restricted sample for which I have data on production.
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I confirm that even in the restricted sample the probability of paying a bribe changes. But
the value of farm output, the acres of land sown, the yield, and expenditures on fertilizers,
pesticides, and irrigation all show no evidence of a significant change. As summarized here
and detailed in Table C.3 (see Appendix C.1), the results are consistent with the model.
I find no evidence that factionalism distorts production; this does not prove factionalism
cannot distort production. We might worry that my test is too noisy and my standard errors
too big to reject a false null. But the noise and error are not too big to the reject that the
chance of paying a bribe changes at the discontinuity. The estimates from Table 3.2 show
a big difference in how bureaucrats treat winners and losers when asking for bribes. If
factionalism distorted production we would expect an equally big difference in output. My
results show that even when factionalism is as bad as it can be—after close elections, when
bureaucrats never ask winners but always ask losers for bribes—any distortion caused is
too small to detect.
The larger question is whether factionalism ever distorts production. Is there anything
about an Indian village that makes the assumptions of Section 3.2 uniquely valid? The first
assumption is that the service provided is either non-rival or not scarce. The government
can give every farmer the Record of Rights to her own land and a connection to the elec-
tricity grid. The government cannot give every firm a the rights to mine a public resource.
A favored firm will get these rights even if it cannot put them to best use.
The second assumption is that bureaucrats know the value of their services—not just
the average value but the exact value for each firm. Knowing the firm’s willingness to pay
lets the bureaucrat set a bribe that does not distort the firm’s actions. Even if the firm has
a credit constraint the model’s prediction holds as long as the bureaucrat knows the con-
straint. He sets the highest bribe the firm is both willing and able to pay. The assumption of
perfect information suits a small Indian village. The land secretary knows how much land
each farmer owns; he knows how large a loan she can get if she proves her land is valid
collateral. He can guess how much she is willing to pay to get the Record of Rights. Per-
fect information is less likely in national government or when the bureaucrat sells services
needed by firms that produce output that is unfamiliar. That said, letting the firm bargain
with the bureaucrat might obviate the assumption if bargaining gives the bureaucrat infor-
mation. My results suggest future research should test whether better informed bureaucrats
demand more efficient bribes.
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3.7 Conclusion
Though distasteful, factionalism need not distort production. I build a model in which
bureaucrats can demand bribes for a government service that makes firms more productive.
Bureaucrats are less likely to be caught demanding bribes from a firm in the losing faction.
Nevertheless they choose bribes that do not distort production from losers to winners. I
test the model in rural Indian villages using a regression discontinuity design. I show
that households of the same caste as the village council president pay fewer bribes for
government services. But as the model predicts, I find no evidence to suggest they produce
more output.
My results differ from earlier work because the setting behind both my theory and
empirics differ. Unlike the citizens in Banerjee (1997), farmers in India need services that
are non-rival. Unlike the government in Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), the government in
an Indian village does not want to correct a market failure. And unlike the bureaucrats in
either model, the bureaucrats in rural India know the value of their services. Future research
must test whether changing these conditions changes the costs of factionalism.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix: Market Failures and Misallocation
A.1 Proof of the Bounding Condition
I prove that my measure of factor market misallocation is a lower bound on the truth.





, and define the ratios without the assumption τ̃ , Λ̃ similarly. According to (1.2)






K+i τ = TI
⇒ τKI = TI
⇒ τ = TI/KI
Identical reasoning shows τ̃ = TI/KI as well, so τ = τ̃ and similarly Λ = Λ̃
The difference between aggregate output with and without the endowment condition is
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where the last step follows because unanticipated productivity φ is independent and
mean 1, and the size of village I is |I|. Since τ
θT ΛθL |I|
YI
> 0, Ei[Eφ[G̃FACTI − GFACTI ]] >
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])
> 0. In words, GFACTI underestimates the
gains from perfect factor markets. Since GI = GFACTI + G
FIN
I it must be that G
FIN
I
overestimates the subsequent gains from financial market perfection. 
A.2 Robustness: Subdistrict-Level Reallocation
This appendix explains how to calculate misallocation at the sub-district level. The firm’s












)θL] 11−σ . Replace the village-level market-clearing con-













where K∗I is the amount of capital the village is optimally allocated, K̄I is the village’s
initial allocation, and wI is an inverse-probability weight (total number of households in


















































A.3 Technical Appendix: General Model
This appendix presents a more general form of the model I use in Section 1.3 to derive my
measures of misallocation, and also derives their asymptotic behavior. Suppose households
are the sole economic actors, and as ever they live to maximize their lifetime utility from
consumption. They earn income by selling or renting out the factors they own (including
labor) and by operating firms. Aside from the usual budget constraint, they face potentially
binding constraints on their choices of factors. For example, if no labor market exists they
are constrained to use exactly their labor endowment. They may also be constrained in their
period-to-period liquidity. They save and borrow at interest rates that need not be common
across households, and may also have to pay an external finance premium to borrow. A
household’s access to insurance may be imperfect, which means its consumption depends
on the profits of its firm. Finally, households differ in their preferences (notably their risk
tolerance) and the productivity of the firms they operate.
Suppose household i owns and operates firm i ∈ It, where It is some group of firms (a
village or a sector). The household maximizes present discounted utility from consumption








cit + bi,t+1 = yit + [1 + rit + ζit(zit − bit; bit,Xoi,t−1)](zit − bit) (Budget Const.)
yit = f(Ait,φit,Xit;θi) (Production)
zit = w
T
it(Xit −Xoit) + pTitIit (Expenditure)
Xok,it = (1− δk)Xok,i,t−1 + Ik,it ∀k = 1, . . . , K
zit − bit ≤ ωit(bit,Xoi,t−1) (Liquidity Const.)
Xit ≤ Xit(Xit −Xoit, Iit) ≤ Xit (Factor Choice Const.)
where I is the information set, f a strictly concave decreasing returns revenue production
function, A anticipated revenue productivity, φ unanticipated revenue productivity, θ a
vector of production parameters, X factor levels used in production, c is consumption, b
borrowing, r the borrowing rate, ζ(·) an external finance premium, yit revenue, Xo owned
factors, I purchase of factors, p a vector of factor purchase prices, z input expenditure, and
ω(·) a liquidity constraint. Xit is a continuously twice-differentiable factor choice trans-
formation function, and Xit,Xit upper and lower bounds on (transformed) factor choice;
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they bound a household’s access to factors beyond those it owns (rented factors). Assume
all past and currently dated variables are elements of I except φ. Rental prices w and all
other prices can vary by household/firm i.
For notational simplicity I model insurance markets implicitly as the correlation be-
tween a household’s unanticipated productivity and its consumption (perfect insurance en-
sures zero correlation). I have assumed away output and asset taxes because they are not
important in the empirical application; accounting for them is straightforward if the tax
schedule is known.1
Let Xk,It be the aggregate stock of factor k among the unit measure of firms in It. De-






Varying factor prices and savings rates, external finance premiums, liquidity constraints,
and factor choice constraints can all distort realized allocations away from the frictionless
benchmark. Eliminating them separates the household problem from the firm problem and
produces the production allocations of the frictionless neoclassical world. Denote outcomes
in the world with no constraints or market imperfections by asterisks, and characterize it
with these conditions:
(Law of One Price) wit = wIt ,pit = pIt∀i ∈ Itmk∀k
(Unconstrained Factor Choices)Xit = X(−Xoit,−Xoi,t−1),Xit = X(∞,∞) ∀i ∈ It
(Perfect Credit Markets) ωit =∞, ζit(·) = 0, rit = rIt ∀i ∈ It
(Perfect Insurance Markets) cit ⊥ φit ∀i ∈ It.
Under these assumptions the firm maximizes per-period expected profit independently




Then the following first-order conditions and market-clearing conditions characterize
1For output taxes, for example, one would simply modify the budget constraint to be cit + bi,t+1 =
(1 − τit)yit + · · · and then perform all subsequent operations conditional on the presence of the taxes to
account for the fact that they will continue to distort even the counterfactual optimal scenarios where market
failures are eliminated.
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the unique general equilibrium outcome:
E[fXk,it(Ait,φit,X
∗




−k,it;θi) di = Xk,It ∀k (A.2)
Solving these equations solves for the optimal allocation vector {X∗it}. The optimal
allocations solve a system of equations that contain only observables and production pa-
rameters estimable from observables. This makes calculating the counterfactual scenario
with production and factor data possible.
To solve for the outcome where factor markets are perfect I must assume unanticipated
shocks are Hicks-Neutral. That is, yit = φitf(Ait,Xit;θi). Since all factors are equally
risky in production, imperfect insurance only affects overall expenditure and not expendi-
ture on capital versus labor. Consider the following hypothetical: Firm i ∈ It, which uses
X̄it in production, now has those factors as “endowments.” Each firm can then trade factors
with −i ∈ I subject to its expenditures being equal to the value of its endowment until its
factor mix is optimal.






wTIt(Xit − X̄it) = 0
Essentially, I have dropped the firms into an Edgeworth economy where their profit func-









∀k, j ∀i (A.3)




−k,it;θi) di = Xk,It ∀k (A.5)
Define efficiency and the gains from reallocation as in the main text. Assume antic-
ipated productivity is also Hicks-Neutral, the production function is homogeneous, and
common production parameters. I can prove this theorem about my measure of the costs
of factor versus financial market failures:
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Proposition 2 (Bounding) Assume yit = Aitφitf(Xit;θi), f is homogeneous of degree σ,
θi = θIt ∀i ∈ It, and E[Ait{(X̃+1,it)σ − (X+1,it)σ}] > 0, where X̃1,it is the quantity of the
first factor i would choose at time t under Unconstrained Factor Choices and the Law of
One Price without being constrained by endowments. Then GFACTI is a lower-bound on
the true gains from moving to Unconstrained Factor Choices and the Law of One Price.
Likewise, GFINI is an upper-bound on the true gains from subsequently creating Perfect
Credit and Insurance Markets.
Proof: Consider the (unobservable and incalculable) outcome where the Law of One
Price and Unconstrained Factor Choices hold without the extra restriction of endowment
conditionality. Call this the True Perfect Factor Market outcome. Denote with super-
script + a variable specific with perfect factor markets and the endowment condition: the
Endowment-Conditional Perfect Factor Market (ECPFM) outcome. Let overset tilde and
superscript + variables come from the True Perfect Factor Market (TPFM) outcome. An
over-bar denotes variables from to the observed/realized outcome. For notational ease, sup-
press the common production parameter θI . I first prove two lemmas useful to the main
result.







for all i ∈ I (that is, all firms in both outcomes will employ
factors in exactly the same proportions).
































Since f satisfies strictly decreasing returns,Xit is unique and thus the Ẍit that satisfies
the above conditions is also unique for each i, t. But the above conditions are not functions
of any variables unique to i (e.g. Ait), and thus Ẍit = ẌIt for all i ∈ It. A similar argu-
ment shows that ¨̃Xit =
¨̃XIt for all i ∈ It. 
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Lemma 2 ¨̃X+It = Ẍ
+
It
for all i ∈ It, that is the mixes of factors will be identical with
TPFM and ECPFM.
Since {X+it } and {X̃+it } are both allocation vectors, each factor must aggregate to the



























To prove the main result, write the difference between the TPFM and ECPFM outcome
as














= E[Aitφitf(X̃+it )]− E[Aitφitf(X+it )]
= E[Aitφit{f(X̃+it )− f(X+it )}]
= E[φit]E[Ait{f(X̃+it )− f(X+it )}]
= E[Ait{f(X̃+it )− f(X+it )}]
where the second equality comes from the measure 1 normalization, the fourth the
independence of anticipated and unanticipated variables, and the fifth the unit mean nor-
malization of φit.
By the homogeneity of f and Lemma 1,
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and by Lemma 2 f(Ẍ+it ) = f(
¨̃X+it ) = a. Applying these results to the above expres-
sions, we have that
Ỹ +It − Y
+
It
= E[Ait{f(X̃+it )− f(X+it )}]
= E[Ait{(X̃+1,it)σa− (X+1,it)σa}]
= aE[Ait{(X̃+1,it)σ − (X+1,it)σ}]
Since a > 0 and E[Ait{(X̃+1,it)σ−(X+1,it)σ}] > 0 by assumption, TPFM output is greater
than in the ECPFM outcome, and so the calculated gains will be as well.
QED
Now suppose that consistent estimators of {Ait,φit,θi} are available. Then it is a
numerical exercise to solve the sample analogs of (A.1) and (A.2) for estimates of the CCM
allocations and (A.3), (A.4), and (A.5) for sample analogs of the PFM allocations. Plug
the computed allocations into the expressions for efficiency and the gains. The following
proposition summarizes the asymptotic properties of these estimators:




estimators of the other components as described above. Finally, assume the expectations
and variances of Ait,φit,θi, yit,Xit are finite. Then the estimators are all consistent and
asymptotically normal.
Proof:
Consistency: I will prove the consistency of ÊÎt; demonstrating the consistency of the
other estimators is similar. Suppress time subscripts for notational simplicity. I will first
identify the population parameters in terms of their moments, and then demonstrate that
the sample analogs are consistent estimators.
Recall that (A.1) characterizes any interior solution to the population optimization - in
other words, if an interior solution exists, the function X∗(Ai,θi,wI) characterizes firm
i’s optimal allocation as a function of i-specific parameters and the prices. Since f is
concave and satisfies DRS, the solution is not only interior but also unique. Moreover, the
Maximum Theorem Under Convexity (see Sundaram, 1996, p. 237) guarantees that X∗
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is a continuous function of the population prices wI (see the Lemma below). Inspection
demonstrates that the optimality conditions are identical for the sample optimization, and
thus the derivedX∗ is as well.
Applying the measure-one normalization, (A.2) in population reduces to
E[X∗(Ai,θi,wI)] = E[Xi].
Note that the sample analog of (A.2) in random sample Î reduces to the sample analog















Since {Âit}, {θ̂i} are consistent estimators for the population technology parameters,
then together with the Lemma below this implies that ŵI is a consistent GMM estimator
for wI .
















∗(Âi, θ̂i, ŵI); θ̂i)
|Î|
.
Since Î is a random sample and yi has finite expectation, the numerator of Ê is consis-
tent for E[yi] by Kolmogorov’s Law of Large Numbers. And since f andX∗ are continuous
in all their arguments and {Âit}, {φ̂it}, {θ̂i}, ŵÎ are all consistent for their respective pop-
ulation parameters, the denominator is consistent for E[f(Ai,φi,X∗(Ai,θi,wI);θi)] by
Kolmogorov’s Law of Large Numbers and the Continuous Mapping Theorem. Then ap-
plying the Continuous Mapping Theorem again, the ratio of the two consistent estimators
is consistent for the population ratio. Thus, ÊÎ is consistent for EI .
88
Lemma (Price Estimator and GMM Consistency): Consider each of the requirements
for consistency in turn.
Consistent Weighting Matrix: There are exactly as many market-clearing conditions
as prices, implying the estimator is just-identified and thus the weighting matrix irrelevant.
Global Identification: Recall that the optimal outcome will be identical to the solution
to the planner’s problem. By the assumption that f satisfies decreasing returns, this will
be a strictly concave optimization with a unique maximizer {Xi}. By (A.1), the condition
fX(X
∗
i ) = w is satisfied for all i. Since fX is a function, the uniqueness of X
∗
i implies
the uniqueness of w. Thus, w uniquely satisfies the market-clearing conditions.
X∗(w) Is Continuous at all w: Observe that X∗ is the solution to i’s optimization
problem, and thus it suffices to show the conditions of the Maximum Theorem hold (see
Sundaram, 1996, p. 237). Observe that since f is assumed continuous inXi, the continuity
condition is satisfied, so one need only show that the constraint set is a compact-valued
continuous function of w. The firm is implicitly constrained to choose positive values of
all factors, so 0 is a lower bound. Meanwhile, since f satisfies decreasing returns, for each
wk there exists some X̃k(wk) such that f(0, . . . , X̃k(wk), . . . , 0) − wkX̃k(wk) = −100.
DefineW(w) =
∑
k wkX̃k(wk). Since the firm always can choose zero of all factors and
earn profit zero, we can impose that wTXi ≤ W(w) and the outcome will be identical to
that of the unconstrained problem. This “budget constraint” is like any other from consumer
theory and thus continuous, and is closed and bounded (thus compact) for allw. Thus,X∗
is continuous by the Maximum Theorem.
w ∈ Θ,Which Is Compact: Since fX > 0 by assumption, w >> 0. Then some
ε > 0 exists such that w >> (ε, . . . , ε). Meanwhile, aggregate demand E[X∗k(Ai,θi,wI)]
for any factor k is continuous and strictly decreasing in wk. Then some w̃ exists such that
E[X∗(Ai,θi, w̃I)] = E[Xi]/2, and w̃k > wk for all k. Then w ∈ [ε, w1]× · · · × [ε, wK ], a
closed and bounded subset of RK , which is thus compact.
E[supw∈Θ ||X∗(w)||] <∞ : Note thatX∗ is determined by the satisfaction of (A.1)
(and the non-negativity constraint). Since fXk is strictly decreasing (by strict concavity)
and strictly positive (by assumption), for any finite w, either the condition will be satisfied
by some finite positiveX∗ or the non-negativity constraint will bind andX∗ will have one
or more zero elements. Observe that Θ as defined above is closed and bounded, so any
w ∈ Θ is finite.
Asymptotic Normality: I again prove the result only for ÊÎ ; similar algebra and ap-
plications of limiting statistics prove the result for the other estimators.2 Suppress time





subscripts for notational simplicity.
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|Î|(ȳ∗i − E[y∗i ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
]
(E[y∗i ]ȳ∗i )−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
By Kolmogorov’s Law of Large Numbers and the Continuous mapping theorem, C
p→
E[y∗i ]−2. By the Lindeberg-Lévy Central Limit Theorem,A
d→ N(0, σy) andB
d→ N(0, σy∗)
for some finite σy, σy∗ . Then by the Mann-Wald Continuous Mapping Theorem and the
replication property of the normal distribution, (E[y∗i ]A − E[yi]B) is asymptotically nor-
mal. Finally, by the Slutsky Transformation Theorem, the product of this term and C is
also asymptotically normal.
A.4 More Details on Estimating the Production Function
This appendix explains why I use the Anderson-Hsiao estimator instead of fixed-effects
and shows measurement error in the factors of production might not bias my estimates of
the production function too badly under plausible assumptions.
A.4.1 Fixed-Effects Versus Anderson-Hsiao
Farmers have individual invariant productivity terms, so the standard approach is to esti-








in logs using fixed-effects (the within estimator). In other words, sub (1.6) and (1.7)
apply the Delta method to prove the asymptotic normality of ĜÎt .
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into the logged production function, and estimate by OLS













+ θK logKit + θT log Tit + θL logLit + [Overall Error]it.
However, the consistency of the estimates requires what Wooldridge (2002) calls the
strict exogeneity assumption:
E[[Overall Error]is | Kit, Tit, Lit] = 0 ∀s, t = 1, . . . , T
The unexplained productivity component [Overall Error]it must be completely cross-
temporally uncorrelated with the regressors of interest, in particular the productive factors.
To see why this might be problematic, consider a farmer who gets a bad unobserved
shock because he accidentally used too much fertilizer. Then although the accident will not
affect contemporaneous or past factor input choices (because it is unpredictable), it might
affect future input choices if the resulting low yield drives him to sell land or capital for
food. A drop in the possession of these factors would be informative about an earlier bad
productivity shock. If the unobserved shock is big relative to household income then OLS
will estimate production shares inconsistently.
Instead I make a weaker assumption of sequential exogeneity Wooldridge (2002). Se-
quential exogeneity only requires that factor levels be uncorrelated with future values of
unexplained productivity:
E[[Overall Error]is | Kit, Tit, Lit] = 0 ∀t = 1, . . . , T and s ≤ t
A bad shock last year can affect capital stock this year as in the previous example
without damaging consistency. Problems only arise if farmers anticipate some part of the
error term, like a technological innovation they acquire but I do not observe. If farmers buy
more land or capital to exploit the innovation the estimator will not be consistent. Large
technological innovations are unlikely in Thailand and affect everyone, so the time and
time-district dummies should capture them. Assuming sequential exogeneity is the same
as assuming Âit completely captures the anticipated component of TFP. I must assume as
much, anyways, for the optimal allocation I compute to be accurate.
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To implement the assumption I first-difference away the fixed component and instru-
ment the differenced factors with their lagged levels. The first stage of the regression for
capital is












+ νK logKit + νT log Tit + νL logLit + ∆[Overall Error]it.
and the second stage is












+ θK∆ logKit + θT∆ log Tit + θL∆ logLit + ∆[Overall Error]it.
The identification assumption is
E[(logKi,t−1)[Overall Error]i,t−1] = E[(logKi,t−1)[Overall Error]i,t] = 0
and so on for land and labor, as well.
A.4.2 Measurement Error in Factor Choices
Given how I construct the measures of capital and labor, measurement error is likely. But
under some assumptions about the nature of the error it should not bias estimates too badly.
Suppose the error ς follows an autoregressive process, relates the true value to the ob-
served value multiplicatively, and is independent of the true value. For simplicity, focus
on capital and ignore TFP modifiers as well as labor and land; this simplification should
not qualitatively affect the argument. Formally, let Koit be the observed value of capital and
suppose
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ςit = ρςi,t−1 + ξit
Assume that ρ is close to 1 and ξit is small; that is, the error is highly persistent over
time. This assumption is plausible because of the way I calculate factor stocks. A house-
hold’s level of capital, for example, is computed by backward depreciating the most recent
purchase of each asset type and aggregating. Any error introduced by associating latest
purchase price with productive value would be carried through to previous years.
The primary regression equation is then
∆ log yit = α∆ logKit + ∆εit
= α∆ logKoit + ∆εit − α(1− ρ)ςi,t−1 + ξit.
The first-stage regression is
∆ logKit = πK logKi,t−1 + εit
⇒ ∆ logKoit = πK logKoi,t−1 + εit + πkςi,t−1.
The estimate of πk will be attenuated because of the correlation between Koi,t−1 and the
lagged measurement error terms. But this will not matter as long as the first-stage remains
strong, and the results suggest it is.
More important is that the lagged level of capital is correlated with−α(1−ρ)ςi,t−1+ξit.
But under the assumptions, this lagged error term is small (because 1− ρ and ξ are small),
so the bias of the IV estimator will be small as long as the first-stage is strong.
The intuition is simple: when the measurement error is persistent, it is captured by the
fixed-effect so the parameter estimates are unbiased. What then happens to the estimates of
efficiency when these fixed-effects make up some portion of anticipated TFP? Assuming
the measurement error is independent of the true fixed component of anticipated TFP, it will
almost certainly bias estimated misallocation upwards. To see why, assume the extreme
case where markets are complete and contingent, so the observed outcome is perfectly
efficient. My noisy estimates of TFP will produce a noisy computation of the efficient
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outcome; this will differ from the realized outcome, so the measure will erroneously mark
the perfectly efficient allocation as inefficient. The true misallocation in rural Thailand may
be even lower than I find.
Although measurement error in capital probably will be very persistent, that need not
hold for labor. If a household member changes his actual time in the fields often the error
in measured labor might fluctuate from year to year. The reader should keep that caveat in
mind while evaluating the results.
A.5 Specification Tests
This appendix runs simple tests of whether the production function is approximately isoe-
lastic (Cobb-Douglas) and whether my measure of anticipated productivity actually cap-
tures the farmer’s ability to farm.
A.5.1 Is the Production Function Isoelastic?
The Cobb-Douglas production function is a special case of the class of constant-elasticity
production functions where the elasticity of substitution ε between factors is 1 (hence al-
















where σ denotes the returns to scale. For computational simplicity I assume Ait =
Aie
ϑt, the product of a fixed effect and a time trend. Take logs of both sides and subtract
away the within household mean to eliminate the fixed-effect. 3
Column 1 of Table A.1 reports the results of estimating the transformed equation with
nonlinear least squares. The test of interest is whether ε differs substantially from 1. As
(1) of Table A.1 indicates, this null is actually rejected. However, the point estimate is
almost identical to one (ε̂ = 1.013) and rejection occurs mainly because the variance of
these estimates is very small. The envelope theorem guarantees misallocation does not
change much with small changes in the elasticity of substitution, so a tiny deviation from
Cobb-Douglas production should not change the results much.
3The ideal way to estimate the equation is the nonlinear equivalent of Anderson-Hsiao: applying GMM
to the first-differenced form of (A.9) using legged factors as instruments. Unfortunately, it does not converge.
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Table A.1
















Pval: ε = 1 0.061
Note: Estimated using fixed-effects nonlinear least-squares.
Standard errors are bootstrapped with resampling at the
household-level.
A.5.2 Is Ait Really a Valid Measure of Productivity?
Anticipated productivity Ait almost wholly determines a farmer’s allocation with perfect
markets. If Âit is a bad measure of true productivity, the optimal allocations I compute
could be completely wrong. If Âit actually measures a farmer’s productivity it should be
correlated with individual and village characteristics that make a farmer more productive.
For example, if Âit is capturing actual productivity it should be higher in areas with
climate and soil better suited to growing rice. And if years spent in school raise produc-
tivity, it should also be higher for more educated farmers. Table A.2 shows a regression
of anticipated TFP Âit on province dummies and two proxies: an index of agro-climactic
suitability for rice and the farmer’s schooling. For schooling I focus on primary educa-
tion, as basic skills like literacy matter most in farming. The results indicate that TFP is
















Note: The regression shows the correlation between predictors of productivity and my estimates of anticipated
productivity. I cluster standard errors by household and include province dummies. Primary Schooling
(years) represents the number of grades of primary school the household head has completed, where someone
who has completed any grades in secondary school (Matthayom) is assumed to have completed six years of
primary school (Prathom). Beyond Primary is a dummy for additional schooling, and Rice Suitability a
district-level agro-climactic index.
A.6 Data Appendix
A.6.1 Village (or higher) Level Variables
International Rice Prices From the IMF’s commodity price data. I took the yearly aver-
age.
Village Wage Rates From Section V of the annual household survey.
For 1996: For each household, find any worker in the ”other” category who lists their
occupation as related to ”labor” or ”labour” and compute their daily wage. Construct
medians by village, subdistrict, etc.
For 1997-2008: For each household, find any worker listed as general agricultural la-
borer of any sort or in the ”other” category reporting an occupation related to ”labor”
or ”labour” and compute their daily wage. Construct medians by village, subdistrict,
etc.
Village Population From Section iii of the annual key informant survey. Survey records
both number of households and population of the village.
Precipitation I obtained gridded monthly rainfall estimates to cover Thailand from 1996
through 2008. The estimates for 1996 and 1997 were .5 x .5 lat-long degree grids
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from the University of Delaware Climate Project’s Terrestrial Precipitation Gridded
Monthly Time Series. Those for the rest of the year were .25 x .25 lat-long degree
grids from NASA’s Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (Product 3B-43). I used Ar-
cGIS’s Topo-to-Raster tool to create an interpolated raster for the rainfall data. I then
used district-level boundaries from the Global Administrative Areas Project (GADM)
to construct district-level monthly averages. I converted the levels to fractional devi-
ations from the mean for each month (where the monthly mean was computed over
the sample period). The rainfall shocks relevant for a particular year match the survey
response period (so rainfall in 1996 is rainfall from May 1996 through April 1997).
Rice Suitability Index I obtained the Food and Agriculture Organization’s Global Agro-
Ecological Zone (GAEZ) data for the climactic suitability of rice and maize. The
data for rice suitability came from Plate 38: Suitability for rain-fed and irrigated
Rice (high input). The data for maize suitability came from Plate 30: Suitability
for rain-fed Grain Maize (intermediate inputs). I computed a zonal mean for each
district: an average value indexing the climate suitability of the district for each crop.
I inverted the index so higher values correspond to greater suitability.
A.6.2 Household-Level Variables
A.6.2.1 Factors of Production
Land I use the land cultivation data from Section XIV (Landholdings) of the Annual
Household Survey. Households report the quantity and value of land they cultivate
(regardless of ownership) by use; that is, they separately report land for rice, field
crops, orchards, and vegetables. I total the area of the plots for each use and mark
this as the land cultivated for each crop. I also deflate the reported value of the plots
and total for each crop to form the value of the land owned.
Capital Owned Mechanical Capital: I use Section XII (Agricultural Assets) of the An-
nual Household Survey. The survey reports the number of assets of each type, where
I group the following assets into broad categories by depreciation rates: tractors
(walking tractors, large and small four-wheel tractors), machines (sets, sprinklers,
and threshing machines) and structures (crop storage buildings). I depreciate tractors
like vehicles, so the depreciation rates I use are 2 percent for structures, 10 percent
for machines, and 20 percent for tractors. I correct clear errors in the series of asset
classes where an asset disappears and reappears without any record of a sale or ap-
pears and disappears without any record of a purchase. I then construct the value of
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assets owned at the beginning of the first survey round by deflating and depreciating
the purchase price by the year of purchase. I then attempt to follow each asset over
time, where I label a piece of equipment a separate asset if the quantity of a certain
type of equipment rises from zero to some positive number. I unfortunately must
treat the addition of new pieces of equipment to an existing stock as identical to the
existing assets of that class; but it is fairly rare that a household has more than one
piece of equipment of a certain class. I then assign a ”price” to each asset with the
sale value at the very latest transaction date I can find for it (where the initial value in
the first survey round is also considered a transaction). I adjust that price for depreca-
tion in preceding and following years and compute the asset value in a given year by
multiplying the price by the quantity held. [Recall the quantity is almost always one
if the household owns any.] If I cannot identify a price, I am forced to drop the asset
from my calculations. [In rare cases where I can identify a year of acquisition but
not a price, I use the intertemporal median of village, subdistrict, or district medians
for the equipment type.] I then aggregate the value of all assets for each household
in each year to construct the value of owned mechanical capital.
Buffalos: I assume buffalo are the only animal used to harvest rice and compute
the value of buffalo using the appropriate responses from Section XII (Agricultural
Assets) of the Annual Household Survey. The household reports the total current
value of all buffalos owned, which I deflate. Missing values for this variable generally
mean the question does not apply (e.g. the household owns no buffalo), so I treat
missing values as zero.
Capital Expenses: For rented capital, maintenance expenses, and intermediate in-
puts (which I treat as capital) I use the portion on farm expenses in Section XVI
(Income) of the Annual Household Survey. After deflating all currency, I compute
intermediate inputs as the sum of expenses on seeds, fertilizers, pesticides/herbicides,
and fuel. I then rescale the value of rented capital by a user cost: the depreciation rate
plus an interest rate, which I set as 4 percent in line with the literature. It may seem
strange to assume a common interest rate given the possibility of financial market
failures; but recall my objective is to create a consistent measure of the productive
value of the capital owned. Allowing the productive value of a tractor to vary based
on the household’s borrowing cost makes no sense. I do not know how much of the
rental cost goes to machines versus vehicles, so I take the depreciation rate as the
average of the rates for each type of asset. Finally, I add the value of maintenance ex-
penses, which is investment (recall I assume investment is immediately productive).
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Total capital is the sum of the value of owned mechanical capital, buffalos, and capital
expenses.
Labor Family Labor: I first construct the quantity of family labor using Section V (Oc-
cupation) of the Annual Household Survey. In each year I count the number of
household members who report being unpaid family laborers in their primary oc-
cupation and report farming of any sort as their primary or secondary occupation
(or report working in the ”FIELDS” if their occupation is not categorized). (Some
farmers grow several types of crops, but the survey only allows two responses for
occupation. To deal with this problem, I reason that a household growing rice will
use its working family members on all of its fields, so any family member who works
in the fields necessarily works in rice.) I define the number of family workers as the
number of household members who satisfy this criterion. I have no intensive margin
information on how much the household works, so I assume all members work sixty
days of the year in the fields (the median number of days worked from the two years
of the Monthly Household Survey available at the time of writing). I aggregate the
per-member days worked for each household-year to compute the quantity of family
labor. (In other words, I multiply the number of family workers by the median days
an individual works on their fields conditional on working at all.)
Hired Labor: The only measure of hired labor is the expenditure on wages recorded
among the farm expenses in Section XVI (Income) of the Annual Household Survey.
I divide the total expenses on wages by the village-level median daily wage (see
above) to construct a measure of days worked by hired labor. Total labor is simply
the sum of family and hired labor.
A.6.2.2 Productivity Modifiers
Catastrophes/Bad Income Shocks I use the questions about bad income years from Sec-
tion II (Risk Response) of the Annual Household Survey. The household reports the
worst of the last several years for income (including the response year), and the rea-
son for it being atypically bad. If a household chooses the response year as the worst,
I mark it as suffering one of the following catastrophes based on the reason it gives:
• Reports bad income this year due to illness
• Reports bad income this year due to death in family
• Reports bad income this year due to retirement
• Reports bad income this year due to flooding
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• Reports bad income this year due to crop-eating pests
• Reports bad income this year due to poor rainfall
• Reports bad income this year due to low yield for other reasons
• Reports bad income this year due to low price for output
Hunger/Undernourishment I have no direct measure of calories and instead adapt the
notion of the staple budget share (SBS) introduced by Jensen and Miller (2010). I
use consumption expenditure data from Section XV (Expenditure) to compute the
fraction of the household’s budget spent on the staple food in Thailand: rice. This
measure includes the value of rice the household grew itself. The intuition behind
this measure is that as a household becomes wealthier (and less hungry) it substitutes
away from the staple crop towards other foods (which are superior goods). The
higher the SBS, the more likely it is the household is hungry.
A.6.2.3 Other Variables
Revenue I use the questions about gross income from Section XVI (Income) of the Annual
Household Survey. Households report their revenue from each of several sources,
including rice farming and other agricultural activities. Enumerators explicitly re-
minded households to include the value of crops they produced and then consumed.
I deflated and constructed income variables for each of the following sources: Rice
Farming, Corn Farming, Vegetable Farming, Orchard Farming, Other Farming.
Education I use the questions about age and education from Section IV (Household Com-
position) of the Annual Household Survey. I keep information about the age, highest
grade completed, and school system of the household head. I defined separate vari-
ables for number of years spent in primary school (generally from 1-6 for P1-P6),
number of years spent in secondary school (generally 1-6 for M1-M6, unless the in-
dividual chose the vocational rather than academic track, in which case I set years
of secondary school to 3), years of vocational school (from 1-3 for PWC1-PWC3,
PWS1-PWS3, or PWT1-PWT3), and years of university (from 1-4).
Rice Farming Experience Households report the number of years spent at their primary
occupation in Section V (Occupation) of the Annual Household Survey. I record the
years spent for individuals who report rice farming as their primary occupation and
categorize themselves as ”owners” of the business. I take this as a measure of the
rice-farming experience of the household (head). In the rare cases where multiple
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household members claim to be the owner of a rice-farming business, I take the
median as the household-level experience.
Constraints I use the questions on farm expansion from Section XII (Agricultural Assets)
of the Annual Household Survey. A household is labeled as ”constrained” if it reports
there is room for profitable expansion in its business. I label it credit-constrained if
it reports insufficient money for labor, land, or equipment among the reasons for
not expanding. I label it factor-constrained if it reports not enough land or labor (a
distinct response from insufficient money) among the reasons for not expanding. A
household can be both credit- and factor-constrained. I further label households as
exclusively credit- or factor-constrained if they report a constraint in one but not the
other.
Risk-Aversion In 2003 the survey started posing to households a hypothetical choice be-
tween staying at their current income forever and taking a job that with 50-50 chance
pays either double or two-thirds their current income. If they choose their current
job the interviewer gives them the same choice except the alternate job now has a
50-50 chance of paying either double or 80 percent of their current income. If the
respondent chose his current job for both questions I marked it as having “high risk
aversion.” Since the question was not asked in 1996, I use the 2003 question in
Section 1.6.
Savings I use Section XIX (Savings) of the annual household survey. I take the total
savings each household has deposited with commercial banks, agricultural cooper-
atives, the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives, PCG village funds,
and a rice bank.
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APPENDIX B
Appendix: Risky Income or Lumpy
Investments?
B.1 Proofs
B.1.1 Generalizing the Risk and Return Predictions











Consider the threshold fixed cost that separates households who choose M activities
























































































> 0 and ∂F̄M
∂w̄p
< 0 for all M . Then a
rise in the riskiness of the primary activity will cause all the thresholds to rise, meaning
households will be willing to pay more for any number of activities. This will cause the
average number of activities in the sample to rise. A parralel argument shows a rise in the
average return decreases all thresholds and decreases the average number of activities.
QED
B.1.2 Verifying the Cost Prediction
We can rewrite expected side income as







































































M̂ + η + ε
where M̂ is the predicted number of activities from the first-stage regression, η is the
direct effect of labor reallocation from changes in the volatility and average returns to the
primary activity, and ε is an independent error term.
The instrumental variables estimate is consistent for the value




If −w̄s ∂Lp∂M + E[M̂γ] > 0, then γA > −F , which implies that if γA < 0 then −F < 0
and thus under-specialization is costly.
First I show that ∂Lp
∂M
< 0. From the expression for Lp found in (B.1) in Appendix B.1.1
we have that a 1 unit increase in M will cause a rise in the numerator of w̄+ and a rise in
the denominator of ασ2p . Since by assumption ασ
2
p > w̄+, the denominator rises by more
than the numerator and the total effect is negative. Thus, ∂Lp
∂M
< 0.


























where the final equality applies the definition of M̂ ; applies the predictions of the effects




; and takes the
deriviatives of Lp found in (B.1) in Appendix B.1.1 with respect to σ2p and w̄p. This proves
that E[M̂γ] > 0.
QED
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B.2 Detailed Data Appendix
B.2.1 Time Series Variables
• Consumer Prices: From Bank of Thailand monthly index, acquired from Global
Financial Data database. Data were used with permission of Global Financial Data.
• International Rice Price: Acquired from IMF monthly commodity price data.
Deflated using monthly consumer price index.
B.2.2 Panel Variables
• Rice Harvest: From module 7 (Crop Harvest) section of the monthly survey. Keep
only un-milled rice (both sticky and non-sticky). Define rice harvest soon as a re-
ported positive harvest of unmilled rice in the subsequent three months. Define rice
harvest past as having had positive harvest of unmilled rice in the current or previous
three months. Define rice farmer (or rice harvest ever) as having had a positive rice
harvest at any point in the survey span.
• Crop-Plots: From module 5 (Crop Activities) section of the monthly survey. Make
the monthly aggregate of “value transacted” for each households sale of each crop.
This is the revenue from crops. For number of crop plots, I use the “projected har-
vest” table, which asks farmers to predict revenue for each productive crop. Every
entry corresponds to a different perceived revenue stream for the farmer, so I take
number of crop-plots as simply the count of these for each household in each month.
• Aquaculture: From module 10 (Fish-Shrimp) of the monthly survey. For each
household, make monthly aggregates of the value of fish and shrimp output; this is
the revenue from aquaculture. I compute whether a household does aquaculture as
whether it reports raising fish/shrimp or having shrimp ponds in a given month.
• Large Businesses: From module 12 (Household Business) of the monthly survey.
For each household, make monthly aggregates of the cash and in-kind revenue plus
the value of products/services consumed by the household; this is the revenue from
large businesses. Compute the number of businesses for each household as the num-
ber of entries in the household report of revenues.
• Small/Miscellaneous Businesses: From module 24 (Income) of the monthly sur-
vey. For each household, make monthly aggregates of the cash and in-kind revenue
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for each “other” income source; this is the revenue from miscellaneous businesses.
Compute the number of miscellaneous activities for each household as the number
of entries in the household report of revenues.
• Number of Jobs: From module 11 (Activities-Occupation). For each person and
each job number in any month, mark if it was worked the previous two and the fol-
lowing two months (note that jobs are not assigned job numbers in their first months,
so technically I only check the previous one month as it must have been worked the
month before to have an ID). If so, it is a “steady job.” I count each households
total number of jobs and steady jobs each month, then compute the number of un-
steady jobs as the difference. For each job and each month, sum the cash and in-kind
payments and aggregate by household-month. This is the monthly job revenue.
• Number of Activities: I define number of activities as simply the sum of the num-
ber of crop plots, the number of livestock activities, the indicator for practice of
aquaculture, the number of large businesses, the number of jobs, and the number of
miscellaneous activities.
• Total Revenue, Consumption, and Transfers: Total revenue is the sum of revenue
from crop activities, livestock activities, aquaculture, large businesses, jobs, and mis-
cellaneous activities. Total consumption is the sum of all domestic expenditures
by both cash and credit plus consumption of home-produced goods. Expenditures
reported at a weekly rather than monthly frequency (in module 23W, Weekly Ex-
penditures Update) are aggregated by month for each household and added to those
reported at a monthly frequency (in module 23M, Monthly Expenditures Update).
Transfers are defined as the household’s net incoming transfers. More precisely, I ag-
gregate by household-month the transfers from people inside and outside the village
and subtract similarly aggregated transfers to people inside and outside the village
(all found in module 13 on Remittances). I use only transfers not earmarked for a
specific event because these unplanned transfers are more like insurance.
B.3 Inference: The Two-Stage Bootstrap
The predicted mean and volatility are both generated regressors, so I must adjust my in-
ference to account for their presence. It is easy to see that under my assumptions the full
estimators match the conditions for Murphy and Topel (2002). Directly applying their an-
alytic expressions is inconvenient and also problematic because small sample bias in the
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Figure B.1
Bootstrap, Step 1: Forming Blocks of Blocks
Make “blocks” of 
current obs and lags 






Note: First, I prepare the time series of rice prices for resampling. I form “blocks” consisting of the current price and however many
lags I need to estimate the time series model. I then group every observation into one or more “blocks of blocks,” adjacent interlocking
sets of observations and their associated lags.
time series estimates might produce an abnormal small sample distribution for the esti-
mated parameters. But the asymptotic normality their propositions guarantee also ensures
the validity of bootstrapped confidence intervals and hypothesis tests.
I implement the procedure as outlined in Figures B.1-B.3. First, I prepare the time series
of rice prices for resampling. I form “blocks” consisting of the contemporaneous price and
however many lags I need to estimate the time series model. I then group every observation
into one or more “blocks of blocks,” contiguous interlocking sets of observations and their
associated lags.
Next, I run the bootstrap replications. Each replication follows five intermediate steps.
First, I sample with replacement the blocks of blocks of rice prices to construct a boot-
strapped time series of equal length to the original time series. I estimate the parameters of
the time series model on the bootstrapped data. I then resample with replacement house-
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Figure B.2





1. Sample blocks 










4. Predict conditional 
mean and variance 
5. Estimate panel 
parameters 
Bootstrap Replication 
Note: Next I run the bootstrap replications. Each replication follows five steps. First I sample with replacement the blocks of blocks of
rice prices to construct a bootstrapped time series of equal length to the original time series. Next I estimate the parameters of the time
series model on the bootstrapped data. I then resample with replacement households (together with all their monthly observations) from
the panel to construct a bootstrapped panel with as many households as the original panel. Then I use the estimated time series model
to predict the conditional mean and variance of the international rice price for each household-month observation. Finally, I estimate the




Bootstrap, Step 3: Constructing Confidence Intervals and P-Values




95% Confidence Interval 
Construct distribution of 
absolute t-stats Original t-stat P-value 
Distribution 
Note: I construct confidence intervals with the dataset of bootstrapped parameters to find the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. These are
the boundaries of the 95% confidence interval. I then compute the absolute t-statistic centered around the original parameter estimate
for each replication. The fraction of these absolute t-statistics that is greater than the original t-statistic is the p-value.
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holds (together with all their monthly observations) from the panel to construct a boot-
strapped panel with as many households as the original panel. Then I use the estimated
time series model to predict the conditional mean and variance of the international rice
price for each household-month observation. Finally, I estimate the panel specification and
record the resulting coefficients. I run 1000 replications for the risk specification and 2000
replications for the IV specifications.
The final step is to compute confidence intervals and p-values. To construct confidence
intervals, I use the dataset of estimated parameters from bootstrap replications to find the
2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. These are the boundaries of the 95% confidence interval. To
construct p-values, I compute the absolute t-statistic centered around the original parameter
estimate for each replication. The fraction of these absolute t-statistics that is greater than
the original t-statistic is the p-value.
B.4 Other Tests of Robustness
B.5 Alternative Model: Minimum Labor Inputs
Is it plausible that the kinds of activities a rice farmer can enter three months before his
harvest would, as my model assumes, have a lumpy fixed cost? Finding casual labor or
growing cassava may be easy if the farmer has already done so every time prices turned
volatile in the past. In this appendix I build a model without fixed costs where risk still
causes under-specialization. The prediction’s robustness is why I emphasize that my model
of risk and under-specialization is not the model, but just a convenient tool to formalize the
intuition.
Let the household’s utility function be as before and for simplicity consider the case of
choosing between perfect specialization and one side activity. The household can costlessly
enter a side activity but must allocate it at least L > 0 units of labor. The lower-bound on
labor choice captures the idea that it is not worth an employer’s time to hire a worker for
only a few hours per week, so even work that does not require paying a fixed cost does
require a lumpy investment of time. I need the lumpiness to make specialization optimal
for some degree of riskiness. Otherwise the household always has a side activity and only
varies how much it works on the side activity instead of whether it has one at all. I also
assume the average return to the side activity is strictly less than the average return to the
primary activity—that is, w̄p − w̄s = w+ > 0. The household faces the trade-off
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Table B.1








- ×Mean 0.00 -86.06
[0.395] [0.307]
- × Volatility -0.09** -368.73
[0.011] [0.531]
Expecting Harvest
- Main 1.37*** -238.27
[0.000] [0.953]
- ×Mean -0.01*** (Excluded Instrument)
[0.000]
- × Volatility 0.05* (Excluded Instrument)
[0.091]
Recent Harvest
- Main -0.63 -27329.39*
[0.263] [0.077]
- ×Mean -0.01*** 147.78
[0.003] [0.390]
- × Volatility 0.17*** 1095.82
[0.003] [0.370]
Household Fixed-Effects Yes Yes
Month Fixed-Effects Yes Yes
Households 743 743
Observations 47395 47395
F-stat Exc. Inst. 10.054
Hansen’s J Stat 0.015
Note: . I exclude observations when households claim they sold rice while still expected their harvest. Volatility still causes households
to enter more activities (Column 1) and the extra activities are costly (Column 2).
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Table B.2
































Note: Suppose wages are correlated with volatility in the rice price. Then the extra jobs the household takes up may not be a response to
risk but rather a response to better earnings in side activities. This table demonstrates that median village wages are not correlated with
the village averages of any of the regressors of interest. I run the analysis at the village rather than individual level because households
might be willing to take lower paying jobs to hedge against risk, lowering the average wage of jobs held even though volatility has no
confounding effect on wages.
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Figure B.4
Intuition of the Alternative Model
Expected Utility 
Variance of Primary Activity’s Returns 
𝐿𝑝 = 1 − 𝜀 𝐿
𝑝 = 1 − 𝐿  
𝐿𝑝 = 1 
M = 0 M = 1
C̄ w̄p w̄p − w+(1− Lp)
V σ2p (L
p)2σ2p + (1− Lp)2σ2s
The opportunity cost of the side activity is w+(1 − Lp), and since it is no less than
w+L > 0 the household still loses a discrete chunk of expected revenue when it diversifies.
Although it does not literally pay a fixed cost the household’s trade-off between the mean
and variance of consumption is similar to the one it faced in the original model. They are
not identical—for example, the cost of diversification is now uncertain—but similar enough
for risk to cause under-specialization.
Figure B.4 gives the intuition. With perfect specialization the household’s expected
utility is maximized when the primary activity’s returns have zero variance, but expected
utility falls steeply as the variance rises. The household can flatten the utility-variance
relationship by moving some labor from the primary activity to the side activity. Without a
lower bound on labor devoted to the side activity, the household would always move ε units
of labor to the side activity and be happier without perfect specialization. But with a lower
bound the household must accept a discretely lower and flatter utility-variance relation. If
the variance of the side activity is low, the household prefers specialization. But when
the variance exceeds a critical threshold the household prefers to diversify. If w+ has a
nondegenerate distribution the average number of activities will rise continuously with the
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variance. Then the lower bound model makes the same prediction dE[M ]
dσ2p
> 0 as the fixed
cost model from the main text.
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APPENDIX C





Official Prob. Bribe Avg. Bribe % All Bribes % Amount
Lekhpal/Patwari 59.89 118.38 18.56 15.09
Line-Man - Electricity Department 43.75 89.12 15.74 9.54
Village Secretary 20.89 105.24 8.82 6.31
PDS - Functionary 9.58 90.50 5.87 3.63
Village Development Officer 51.54 76.46 4.76 2.47
Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (ANM) 17.89 117.84 4.24 3.40
Doctor - Local Animal Husbandry Centre/Hospital 27.93 124.38 3.80 3.24
Gram Pradhan 5.27 346.62 3.59 8.54
Pharmacist at PHC/Community Health Centre 10.01 93.86 3.19 2.04






























































































































































































































































































































































Evidence of Distortions to Production
A. Services
Gave Bribe Total Services Total Borrowed Average Interest Loan from Govt.
Estimate -0.937*** 1.992 -44.966 4.803 0.026
(0.336) (3.017) (703.018) (10.291) (0.200)
Observations 1054 1054 1054 486 1054
Elections 88 88 88 70 88
B. Production
Gave Bribe Value of Output (Rs.) Land Sown (Acres) Yield Fertilizer (Rs.) Pesticide (Rs.) Irrigation Exp. (Rs.)
Estimate -1.070** 2662.105 -6.011 34.202 195.222 98.016 12.097
(0.533) (6409.768) (11.500) (450.035) (680.059) (222.821) (98.590)
Observations 566 566 566 566 566 566 566
Elections 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
Note: Panel A shows that being in the winning faction does not change the farmer’s access to government services. The second column
shows that winners seek no more services than losers. The third and fifth colums show that winners borrow no more money and are
no more likely to get loans from the government. The fourth column shows that conditional on taking loans the winners pay no less in
interest. Panel B shows that being in the winning faction does not affect production. The data on production come form the 2006 and
1999 rounds of the survey, which typically fall within the current and previous village council. I must discard the other elections. The
first column verifies that the sample is not too small to detect factionalism; winners are still less likely to pay a bribe. But the other
columns show there is no evidence that winners produce more output or use more inputs.
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